40
EPTEMBER 1988

SOVIET WEEKLY
WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

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

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The Solyanik affair, or glasnost in stagnation times

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NEW TIMES

. 40, September 1988

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light of the week

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The Soviet troop pullout from Afghanistan: why aren't those who have insisted on it happy? ● An unprecedented interview: Soviet journalists meet with a leader of the Afghan armed opposition ● Is Pakistan contemplating a "retaliatory strike"?

See p. 12 for a report from Islamabad

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

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OPINIONS

V. Kushakov,
electrical engineer,
Krasnoyarsk Territory,
U.S.S.R.

■ I think the time has come to ban military exercises conducted in member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Such exercises augment war hysteria in the world and cause immense damage to the environment. Now that new political thinking is gaining ground, the adoption of such a decision seems quite realistic. It is time to establish relations of friendship, and not demonstrate military power.

Joseph Besher
Tokyo, Japan

■ A Russian by birth, I live and work in Japan and am a long-standing subscriber to your magazine. For a long time I have been thinking of sponsoring an exhibition of Nikolai Roerich's pictures in Japan, especially those painted on oriental motifs. As a schoolboy in Harbin, Manchuria, I happened to see and listen to Roerich and read his books. One of them, "Banner of Peace," is still relevant today.

It would be a good thing to hold an exhibition of Roerich's works from collections in the Soviet Union and the United States, where there is a Roerich museum. Nikolai Roerich was not only a painter but also a philosopher. He called on people to preserve cultural values. Unfortunately, the Japanese are not familiar with his work. I am sure that an exhibition of Roerich's pictures would be an event of international importance.

It will, of course, be difficult for me to arouse public interest in Roerich and organize an exhibition of his pictures in Japan. I know of a Japanese organization friendly to the Soviet Union, but assistance from the U.S.S.R. would nevertheless be indispensable. Who could give me such assistance?

CARRYING ON THE DISCUSSION

M. Lituyev
Komsomolsk-on-Amur,
U.S.S.R.

■ I have been a regular reader of New Times for many years. But this is the first time that I have written to you. I am especially interested in reports from Afghanistan. However, it distresses me to read them. I think you do not always give an objective picture of the situation in that country and do not tell the whole truth, bypassing the most acute issues. It is easy to talk about past events because the problems we did not even know of at the time are clearly seen today.

It is important, in my opinion, to establish whether an alternative to the military solution existed. A great many questions are not clear to me, though a lot of material has been published. For instance, it should have been stated outright long ago whether it was necessary to send our troops to Afghanistan. Until this is stated definitively, we should not reopen the bleeding wound and aggravate this painful problem, especially for relatives of those killed in action. That is why it is necessary to examine the matter carefully before talking about sacrifices that were made in vain.

Andrei Rudenko,
student,
Bratsk, U.S.S.R.

■ Looking through my desk diary for next year, I came across the section of memorable events and anniversaries. One entry reads: December 21: 110th anniversary of the birth of Stalin, leader of the Communist Party and Soviet state and the international communist and working-class movement.

I would like to ask indignantly of those who put out the calendar: must we really – looking at the smiling face of Stalin (also in the calendar) celebrate December 21 every year as the anniversary of the man who, to satisfy his own ambitions, destroyed the lives of millions of people who were far dearer to us? Strange as it may seem, no room was found for many of them in the calendar. All this is, indeed, strange, to say the least.

Nina Lazarenko
Dnepropetrovsk,
U.S.S.R.

■ The most frightful thing about Stalin was the appalling gap between what he did and what he said. In words, he was building socialism and raising builders of socialism, spiritually rich people. But, in reality, he was building a punitive bureaucratic apparatus which, like a giant meat grinder, ground up thousands upon thousands of people.

One sometimes reads that, despite his crimes, Stalin did not destroy the foundations of socialism. Was that so indeed? "Thanks" to Stalin, socialism became so distorted that in subsequent years new generations virtually lost faith in it. They had faith in money, a lucky break and their elbows.

It was only recently that a light began to flicker in their devastated souls. How are we to break the bureaucratic apparatus and cleanse these souls of the rust of apathy? Readers' discussions could be very helpful in this respect. Let people give their views, as I have done today.

Pyotr Panaseiko
Togliatti,
U.S.S.R.

■ The decision of the 19th Party conference on the building of a monument to the victims of Stalinist repressions can only be welcomed. But another thing grieves me. As long as the remains of the butchers of those to whom we are going to erect a monument lie near the Kremlin wall, we shall be under an obligation to the martyrs.

Unfortunately, the question of transferring the remains of Stalin, Zhdanov, Voroshilov, Vyshinsky and others to another place was not raised at the conference. Perhaps it will be decided after the commission of the Political Bureau has concluded its investigations. But that should have been made public, if we are really talking about glasnost.

André Maire
Longueuie, Canada

■ On the Glasnost page of issue No. 25, 1988, I read Boris Minin's lettter about the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity, established in January of this year. "How should the fund operate?" he asks, and proposes concrete measures.

My first reaction to the letter was: at last we have a reader who wants to do something for peace, and not just applaud others. I wholeheartedly welcome this desire. I fully support the proposal to establish a publishing house that would operate on the basis of a free exchange of information between various countries.

I suggest that an arts council be formed at such a publishing house. Its principal – and very difficult – task would be to determine what topical subject should be brought up for public discussion. The council should also offer its

GLASNOST

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on NT's readers to "give
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iai Navnyko
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Victor Kachin,
engineer,
Stepnogorsk, U.S.S.R.

■ I have been a reader of New Times for several years. Recently it has not only become better but also fuller and more informative. It's a pity not many people know about the magazine. I don't understand, however, why you ignore the psychology of the average reader. He likes a variety, and you offer him for the most part very serious articles. I wish you would publish something in a lighter vein.

CORRESPONDENCE

Igor Mikhailusenko,
poet,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

■ The problem of space exploration has drawn the attention of more and more people recently. The Soviet probes launched to Mars and one of its satellites, Phobos, the planned mission of the American Discovery vehicle, discussions on the possible flight of a Soviet-American crew to Mars, and the detection of a humanoid image on the rocky surface of Mars prompted me – during my visit to the United States on a peace mission this summer – to write a letter to Senator John Glenn, one of the astronauts who landed on the moon.

In the letter I expressed my views on the proposed manned flight to Mars and asked John Glenn to share his ideas on this question. The American astronaut sent me this reply.

John Glenn,
Senator,
Washington, D.C.,
U.S.A.

■ The direction and emphasis of our efforts in space have changed a great deal since I was associated with the programme. In those early years the emphasis was simply putting a man into space and bringing him safely home. Today, the benefits of further manned and unmanned space exploration are abundant in the quest for new scientific and technological discoveries. We most definitely can secure many additional rewards by continuing our efforts in space.

The justification for our space programme lies in the benefits it produces for us both now and in the future, benefits which enhance the lives of each and every one of us. Consider that countless human lives and millions of dollars have been saved through satellite warnings of hurricanes, typhoons and severe storms; advanced weather forecasts have increased crop yields worldwide; and communication satellites continually bring us closer together, linking continents at half the cost of ten years ago. Only continued national commitment to a long-term, well-funded programme of space science and exploration will enable the United States to maintain its leadership in space. For this reason I believe that we should seriously consider a manned mission to Mars.

Many options exist for its implementation, including international cooperation. Although I do not rule out the possibility of a joint venture with the Soviet Union, I still have several questions about its implications for technology transfer. For example, technological advances in the aerospace industry are integral parts of the national economy. Should we allow valuable technology, developed at a cost of millions by the U.S. government and private sector, to be transferred to other countries with whom we are in competition? This concern exists particularly when dealing with the Soviet Union because our national security is involved.

We must be sure that the peaceful uses of space will be enhanced by the inevitable transfer of technology stemming from a joint venture. The idea of a joint venture is being explored by NASA. But we must be sure that our national security will be maintained...

AN ARTIST'S COMMENT



g by Alexander Mitnik (Odessa, U.S.S.R.)

GLASNOST

HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK

PRIVATE OPINION

RITT BJERREGAARD, chairperson of the Social Democratic Party's parliamentary faction, Denmark

Mr Shevardnadze's speech in the Borsen Executive Club seemed to me to be frank and honest. I liked his straightforward answers to the questions that interested us, and his open recognition of existing difficulties. I believe his visit to have been very positive for the continuation of Danish-Soviet dialogue.

It is naturally important for a small country like ours that dialogue between the superpowers is developing, as this lessens the danger of war and conflicts. We made active use of Danish membership of NATO to impel the United States to start such a dialogue at a time when President Reagan was not prepared for it. Fortunately, we managed to bring about a positive turn of events, especially in Europe. We want further relaxation of tension and we see indications that the outlook for it is bright. But, alas, the division of Europe remains a reality, and this naturally disturbs us.

As a member of the European Community, Denmark can influence the processes developing on the continent. Being a small country, it uses existing possibilities for contacts with small countries in Eastern Europe, especially Hungary and the German Democratic Republic. Such contacts are very useful.

MARVIN STONE, Deputy Director of the U.S. Information Agency

The Fourth General Conference on U.S.-Soviet Relations has just ended in Tbilisi, Georgia. It enabled thousands of American and Soviet citizens to meet and get acquainted with each other, hear reports delivered by representatives of the two countries and put questions to them.

Our countries have always engaged in a lively dialogue, albeit sometimes extremely polemical. But at the general conferences we have learned to discuss even the most delicate issues in a proper and respectful way. In Tbilisi we felt the hospitality and cordiality of our Georgian hosts.

The conferences in Chautauqua (twice), Jurmala and Tbilisi are officially associated with the President's U.S.-Soviet Exchange Programme devised as a result of the first Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva in 1985, and the U.S. Information Agency is directly connected with them.

The presidential programme for American-Soviet exchanges is closely linked with the Chautauqua Institute, which is an example of fruitful cooperation between government and public organizations. We take pride in this cooperation and our continuing cooperation with the Soviet sponsors of these meetings, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

THOMAS SCHMIDT, a leader of the Coordinating Committee of F.R.G. Peace Movement

Here in Moscow, at the fifth international information meeting sponsored by the Soviet Peace Committee, we felt the changes taking place in the U.S.S.R. This was strikingly manifested in the course of discussions, which have become more profound and frank. It is significant that Soviet participants expressed different views and upheld them. This can only be welcomed.

We want to maintain and extend contacts with the independent critical groups that took part in the meeting. Discussions with them will help them define their positions on one or other issue more clearly. There is now much talk about citizen's diplomacy. It is very important that an appeal should again be made in Moscow for the creation of more favourable conditions in which ordinary people from East and West can meet and get to know each other.

Those who have been to Moscow will never be persuaded that the Soviet Union is going to attack any country or that it should be feared. When people meet and talk freely, they understand each other better, because their supreme interest is the strengthening of peace. This was clearly demonstrated by the recent international information meeting in Moscow.

Facing the ocean

The Soviet Union's Krasnoyarsk initiatives provide at once a continuation and a critical appraisal of the Soviet proposals put forward two years ago on strengthening security and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region.

Our correspondent talks of today's problems in the region with the chief of the department of Pacific research of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Vladimir Ivanov.

New Times. I suggest taking a look at the Krasnoyarsk proposals through the prism of the general situation in the Asian-Pacific region (APR). What is the political situation in the region today?

Vladimir Ivanov. The configuration of relations between the separate countries of the region and groups of countries is very complex. Practically all the nuclear powers are present there: the U.S., China, the U.S.S.R. and France. Increasingly often there are clashes between the economic interests of Japan and the U.S., between the "new industrial countries" and their developed partners. Nor are relations in the U.S. – China – U.S.S.R. – Japan quadrangle developing straightforwardly.

There are still a number of political anomalies in the APR. One is the partition of Korea, the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, and another is the problem of Taiwan. Nor can the long years of hostility in Sino-Soviet relations and the military clashes between China and Vietnam be described as normal. Relations between China and India remain strained. The situation in Kampuchea continues to complicate the situation in the area, although some progress is perceptible.

Generally accepted international norms do not operate to the full in the region: the United States, for instance, has no diplomatic relations with Vietnam or the D.P.R.K., and the Soviet Union has none with South Korea. There is no peace treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. Each country in the region has its own view as to the sources of danger, at times merely contingent and sometimes even imaginary. It would be no exaggeration to say that practically all the large countries in the region, in one combination or another, are regarded by their neighbours as a potential threat or a source of instability. That greatly complicates the multilateral political process. We have an almost paradoxical situation where economic life often proceeds in isolation from political realities and unresolved problems.

Yet the Pacific countries, especially a number of countries in East Asia, including China, today make up a new and extremely influential and dynamic factor in the economic renewal of the region and indeed in the entire world economy. One hears increasingly often that the 21st century will be the century of the Pacific. This could be something of an exaggeration in view of the growing economic interdependence. Nevertheless, a new world economic centre can be said already to have developed in the region.

N.T. And what is the role of the U.S.S.R. in the region? It seems that two years ago we believed that this problem could be more easily resolved than has turned out in reality to be the case.

V.I. Stereotypes die hard, and continue to affect economic and political relations. When Mikhail Gorbachev spoke in Vladivostok he noted that we had grown accustomed to regarding the Far East as the country's "outpost" in the Pacific. But he added that such a view was no longer adequate; it was essential to think of the area's economic potential, the parameters of its social development, its place in the national economy and the international division of labour. Evidently with that in mind, shortly afterwards a long-term programme for the comprehensive development of the Far Eastern economic area was drawn up. But suddenly we find in it words to the effect that the implementation of economic changes would strengthen the position of the Far East as... the country's outpost in the Pacific. In other words, the approach remained unchanged!

Concern for our Far Eastern borders is a good thing. But times change, and questions pertaining to the defence of our territory have a different ring today. There are no direct threats to our sovereignty. The time has come to determine what the purpose was of our exit to the Pacific. To use it for the benefit of the entire nation or to keep our neighbours – and ourselves – in a constant state of tension?

That is far from being a rhetorical question. When you discuss the problem of a "closed" Vladivostok with Naval representatives, the first thing you hear is that the city was built as a military base on the Pacific. So how can one talk of opening it up, foreign tourism or joint ventures... The country's security is sacred in this country, thousands of millions of rubles are allocated to it, often without requiring any account of how they were used. But let us look at the problem from another angle: do we intend to use military means alone to "defend" this vast and little developed territory? For decades people have settled there with great reluctance...

N.T. And not always voluntarily...

V.I. That too. This also adds to the psychology of a "temporary arrangement," leaving its impact on the area's backwardness not only in economic, but in social and cultural development. About three per cent of the entire population of the country lives in such conditions, and the area's contribution to the national income is commensurate with its population's proportion to the overall population of the country.

N.T. The official stand taken by a number of Asian-Pacific countries is that so far the economic presence of the U.S.S.R. in this section of the world economy is insignificant. Perhaps that-

is what lies behind the mistrust of Soviet Far Eastern and Pacific policy?

V.I. That is one reason, but not the main one. So far the Soviet Union has not found its real place in the APR, and in many cases we have made no use of existing opportunities. And as Mikhail Gorbachev remarked, we are far from concluding that it was only external circumstances that prevented it.

The old model of developing and using the resources of the Far East can hardly be of any use – you won't get far on unprocessed raw materials. What is needed is a long-term strategic approach to the development of our Far Eastern economy and foreign economic ties.

The Krasnoyarsk speech raised the question of making foreign economic ties more dynamic, with due account taken of the specific conditions in the Far East, and of drafting special economic measures to create special preferential conditions for the Pacific regions of the country.

N.T. And if the situation is viewed from the military-political angle? It is widely believed in the West that the U.S.S.R. is allegedly continuing to build up its military strength in the Far East and threaten the stability of the region.

V.I. The new thinking cannot develop forever on a unilateral basis. For instance, the Soviet Union is scrapping, practically on a unilateral basis, the intermediate-range missiles stationed in the Asian part of its territory. Hasn't the Soviet Union grounds for fearing for its security in the Far East? History indicates the existence of serious regional problems that had to be taken into account in planning defensive measures, specifically, developing modern naval forces.

Moreover, the confrontation with the U.S. existed not only in Europe, but also in the Pacific region.

N.T. But official Soviet representatives have stated on more than one occasion, and stated with regret, that the Soviet Union allowed itself to be drawn into an arms race, that full use was not made of political mechanisms, that the political answers to challenges lagged behind military defensive measures...

Vietnamese troops are leaving Kampuchea. A half of the Vietnamese contingent will return home this year. A settlement in Kampuchea will contribute towards a healthier atmosphere in the entire APR.

Photo by Reuters

V.I. All that is so. But let us speak concretely. If we take the Pacific region we find that the security of the Soviet Union's friends and allies was repeatedly subject to real, not imaginary threats. Take, for instance, the triangular relationship between the U.S.S.R., China and the U.S. some 15-10 years ago...

One also has to take into account such factors as the geographical and military-political ties between the U.S. and its closest allies. All this makes the position of the Soviet Union in the Far East a far from simple one, and one that differs sharply from the European situation.

But in spite of all this, it should be stressed that the Soviet Union's militarty activities in the region are by nature defensive and are built on the principle of sufficiency for defence. Even a non-specialist can see the big difference in the military potentials of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the Pacific. The structure of the military confrontation is asymmetrical not only in its quantitative parameters, but also qualitatively.

Nevertheless, the number and scale of military exercises conducted by the Soviet Union in the Far East and adjacent waters have in the past two to three years been limited.

Washington has also been invited to start talks on limiting the scale of military activity in the North Pacific, and on reducing armaments. Some progress, albeit very modest, was made at recent meetings between the defence ministers of the two countries. Their positions did draw somewhat closer on the question of preventing dangerous incidents, especially in the event of activities by Soviet and American troops in the neighbouring areas, and dangerous activities of fleets...

But on the whole, the past two years have shown that the United States has so far been in no hurry to enter into comprehensive negotiations on a mutual reduction of the scale of military activity in the Pacific. Its positions are clearly more advantageous. And it intends to keep it that way.

By the middle of this year an almost absurd situation had developed: the summit in Moscow and ratification of the INF treaty, and practically no progress in the APR. It looks as if Washington has recently chosen as the formula guiding its relations with the Soviet Union: "Détente in Europe and a policy of strength in the Pacific."

N.T. Apparently it is U.S. influence in the region and Washington's well developed ties with the APR countries that have the greatest impact on the overall situation in the region...

V.I. Of course. And that's probably why, despite the specific features of the region, our conversation has taken a Soviet-American turn. Although, of course, this set of problems far from exhausts the problems of the region. It is because the interests in the APR are so

THE NAVAL BALANCE IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN

	U.S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. allies	U.S.	U.S. allies
Aircraft carriers	–	–	7	–
Helicopter and VSTOL carriers	2	–	6	–
Major combatants over 2,000 tons	44	–	105	46
Major combatants under 2,000 tons	36	11	–	134
Attack submarines	77	–	42	36
Naval aircraft	461	–	1,016	334

Statistics by U.S. researcher Tom Gervasi (as per 1987)

numerous and varied that a many-sided mechanism is required to sort them out, in conjunction with bilateral contacts. Our country would like to ensure its security interests chiefly by political and economic means, promoting a climate that would remove hostility, suspicion and mistrust. That was stressed in Krasnoyarsk. And achievements in the Soviet-American dialogue are not enough for that.

The seventh proposal in number, but I would say first in significance, in the Krasnoyarsk "package" concerned setting up a negotiating mechanism to discuss questions of security in the APR. This is the key to implementing the proposals on consultations between the main naval powers in the region in order to freeze the present level of naval and air forces and limit their activity. Such talks could help determine the possibilities for reducing the level of military confrontation where the shores of the U.S.S.R., China, Japan, the D.P.R.K. and South Korea come closest, in order to freeze and then begin a commensurate reduction of armed forces, which is particularly important for the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

N.T. What concrete steps could be taken at the first stage with the help of an international negotiating mechanism?

V.I. For instance, an agreement could be concluded on preventing incidents on the high seas and the air space over them, including a tripartite agreement on these issues between the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Japan. Incidentally, in all these Soviet initiatives, Japan is regarded not as an American aircraft carrier, but as a separate entity, not only politically, but also militarily. Japan's independent role could be displayed within the framework of meetings between the military and the heads of military departments on a broad spectrum of questions of military activities in the region. The proposed meeting of foreign ministers of the interested countries in the region could map out and determine approaches to the building of new relations in the Asian-Pacific region.

As for the Soviet Union's military intentions, they are set out sufficiently clearly – above all not to increase the number of any types of nuclear weapon in the region. Up to now that has only been a unilateral pledge assumed by the U.S.S.R. But it could be of special significance. It could also be interpreted as a unilateral restraint on the Soviet Union's part in deploying sea-based cruise missiles with nuclear warheads (similar to Tomahawks) on submarines and ships. If that is the case, then one could expect corresponding steps from the United States. There is no sense in going through all the stages of the European version of moving towards the abolition of medium- and shorter-range missiles. The U.S. position on the question of sea-based cruise missiles being as it is, I think, it would make sense to freeze their arsenals, to begin with.

N.T. And the problems of military détente outside the realm of Soviet-American relations?

V.I. One thing that could help ease the situation in the region is the further normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and China. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the glimmers of new approaches to the Kampuchean problem, the beginning of a reduction of tension on the borders of China, Mongolia and the U.S.S.R. (part of the Soviet contingent has already been pulled out of Mongolia) not only promote better Sino-Soviet relations, but also an overall improvement in the situation in the APR.

The principles of the political philosophy of the U.S.S.R. and China on nuclear weapons are very close, and virtually coincide on the admissability of the concept of nuclear deterrence. It could be supposed that this has made it easier for the Soviet Union to give up all medium- and shorter-range missiles in the Asian part of the country. Perhaps there'll come a time when we will be able to consider removing the nuclear factor completely from Sino-Soviet relations and find an appropriate treaty mechanism.

In the final count, if methods of nuclear deterrence fade in general into the past in relations between states, then two neighbouring socialist countries possessing nuclear arms should set an example and get rid of all the remnants of the logic of nuclear confrontation. That would have immense significance for both the APR and the situation in the world as a whole. A convention banning the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons – an idea put forward in the Delhi declaration – could become a model of the "nuclear deblocking" of the situation. At the initial stage, the Soviet Union, China and India could be parties to such an accord... Of course, the reduction of conventional weapons also deserves the greatest attention.

N.T. Military-political problems are impeding the development of political and economic relations. Nevertheless, some progress has been made in these fields in the past two years, hasn't it?

V.I. It's true that so far we haven't managed to rid ourselves of many military-political problems. But there have been positive changes, especially in Sino-Soviet relations, some ASEAN countries, Australia. Relations with India continue to develop successfully. During the past two years a dialogue has been started with most countries in the region, at a high and summit level with some of them, and the Soviet Union has established interstate contacts it has never had before.

Both in Japan and China lately prospects have been discussed for economic cooperation between the countries in the Sea of Japan. The idea of developing tripartite Sino-Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation would seem to find support in China too. As for Japan, it seems to have shown greater attention and interest to the Krasnoyarsk "package" than, say, the United States. Obviously the participation of Japanese companies in Sino-Soviet projects could help greatly to liven up economic ties between the three neighbouring countries. And with the overall situation in the Korean Peninsula improving, it might be possible to arrange economic ties with both capitalist and developing countries, as well as between the Soviet Union and South Korea.

N.T. In conclusion I should like to ask about the prospects for the Soviet Union's broad cooperation with the APR countries. They look very promising, but does the way things are going and the experience of the two years since the Vladivostok speech give grounds for optimism?

V.I. Of course, many questions still remain open. Nevertheless, on the whole the prospects are good. The Krasnoyarsk "package" has added much that is new. The comments on it were more lively than on the Vladivostok initiatives, and this gives us hope. Without broad and profound foreign economic ties in the Pacific area it is indeed hard to count on the development of mutual understanding and relations of trust in the political arena. We are making no little effort to activize our ties in the region. For instance, the Soviet Union is prepared to participate in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in forms acceptable to its members. So far the Soviet Union only has guest status in the organization. We shall also try to participate in all other forums organized by the countries of the region. And we seek likewise to contribute to developing cooperation.

An international gathering of representatives of political, business and scientific circles from a number of countries in the region is to take place early in October in Vladivostok. Its aim is to provide us with a better understanding of our neighbours in the region in the course of an exchange of views on a variety of issues important to the entire Asian-Pacific community of nations. All countries are interested in a normal and predictable development of events.

Interviewer ROSTISLAV ZOLOTARYOV

EXCLUSIVE FOR NEW TIMES

Possibilities for dialogue

Interview with Kim Yong Sam, a South Korean opposition leader

Kim Yong Sam, chairman of the Reunification Democratic Party, was one of the main candidates in the presidential election last year. I happened to meet him twice – in Tokyo, where the 60-year-old politician was recently on a visit, and in Seoul, during the Olympic Games. The interview is a combination of Kim Yong Sam's replies at these meetings.

As far as I know, this is the first time a prominent South Korean politician has been introduced by the Soviet press to its readers. Is there anything you would like to say at the start of the interview?

First of all, I would like to say what I think of Soviet Russia's policy. So far Gorbachev seemed to have the stature of a leading world figure. Despite the serious ideological differences between our countries, I personally admire his bold leadership. I have had the opportunity to see him on televison and to read his speeches in newspapers. I have formed an opinion of him as an impressive leader of a new type. I think he is now creating a fresh image of the Russians, and his diplomacy is creating a new type of international political climate and, simultaneously, a good image of your country.

I was very impressed by his speech in Vladivostok in which he called for peace in the Asian-Pacific region. The call has been backed up by practical steps, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Mongolia. He also spoke of the development of Siberia and the Far East, and the need to promote regional cooperation in the Pacific.

During my visit to Tokyo I proposed establishing a Northeast Asian parliamentary conference composed of six nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, South and North Korea, Japan and China) and designed to facilitate exchanges and understanding between the peoples of the region. I think my proposal has some connection with the Vladivostok speech of Gorbachev, because I stressed the importance of Northeast Asia in world politics.

What is the main purpose of the Northeast Asia parliamentary conference and the range of issues to be discussed? How do you see the possibility of dialogue within its framework, given that there are no diplomatic relations between a number of the proposed participants?

My proposal is aimed at strengthening peace in Northeast Asia, especially in connection with the reunification of the peninsula. It could be a starting point for a dialogue between North and South Korea and for reunification. Indeed, we have no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or China. Neither North nor South Korea are members of the United Nations. But both, like the Soviet Union and China, are members of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. So if we talk as parliamentarians, we can easily avoid diplomatic problems and find alternative channels for dialogue.

What is the attitude of Japanese political circles to the six-nation conference you have proposed? I know you have met some political leaders in Japan.

I met with Premier Takeshita and leaders of the Liberal-Democratic and Socialist parties, as well as of the Komeito (Clean Government Party) and the Democratic Socialist Party. All of them not only backed my idea but also promised every possible assistance in advancing it.

A few words about the socialist countries. I think it is a healthy and hopeful sign when people meet. I am completely in favour of exchanges of this kind. My position, and the position of my party, consists in doing everything possible for the promotion of good relations. I think it necessary to take advantage of favourable opportunities for the normalization of political relations between all countries.

You probably know that South Korea is in the process of democratization. It is highly significant that in the National Assembly election the opposition parties won an impressive majority – about two thirds of the seats. This is an entirely new situation where any major change in policy can only be undertaken with the approval of the opposition. The opposition parties are assuming a more important role and greater responsibility in the shaping of foreign policy. The promotion

of ties of any kind, any kind of exchange with the socialist countries, is called "Northern policy" or "Northern diplomacy" in South Korea. As an opposition leader, I have taken upon myself an important role in the shaping of "Northern policy." I have greater freedom of action, as I bear responsibility but am outside the government. We in the opposition are acting as a government, but we are outside it.

As you know, South Korea was ruled by a dictatorship for a considerable period. At that time no one dared talk about the socialist countries. I was the first to talk openly in the National Assembly about the need to develop relations with socialist states. I have declared my readiness to make every effort in this respect, to go to Moscow, Beijing or Pyongyang. In the past, this would have meant a serious violation of the so-called security law. Now, democratization is in progress, and we can talk about such matters more easily. The time has come to explore posssible avenues of cooperation between South Korea and socialist countries.

I personally think that such contacts should be developed. Why? We sincerely hope for a settlement of the Korean problem. But this is impossible without the understanding and assistance of the socialist countries. That is why I am so interested in doing everything necessary to promote understanding between South Korea and the socialist states.

Frankly, I think we had insufficient information about the socialist countries because there was no real freedom under the previous regimes. Despite this situation, our people are displaying a keen interest in peace initiatives, and we would be glad to bring about peace in Korea at any price. We are well disposed to your people and the Chinese people, your leadership and the Chinese leadership. These two countries hold the keys to the maintenance of peace. We have very positive feelings towards your country.

Special mention should be made of cooperation. Economic cooperation is mutually advantageous to our two countries. Personally, I am very much in favour of it.

We are very proud that the Olympic Games are being held in Seoul. I think it presents us with the best opportunity ever to start a dialogue with all of these countries.

Now about the students. They helped us wake up to the necessity for and importance of Korean reunification. At the same time, students should not be allowed to make political decisions. That is the job of the government and politicians, and the nationally important question of reunification should be decided by parliament. I think students should be able to oppose the government, but not the liberal democratic system we have fought for so long to establish.

I think the talk of a coalition government is a reflection of the strategy of the government party. You know that the government party does not have a majority, and there is no guarantee that it will be able to remain in power. That is why it is looking for any possibility of staying in office. A coalition is one such possibility. Meanwhile, as you know, my party is second in terms of the confidence it enjoys with the electorate. We have good chances of winning the next election. That is why the government party is scheming to prevent elections. So any talk of a coalition is nonsense until the political legacy of the past has been abolished.

I believe the presence of American troops in South Korea to be an element of deterrence against any acts of violence or war, but that does not mean I am in favour of the permanent deployment of American troops in Korea. I think they will be withdrawn some day. That day will come when peace in the peninsula is secure.

Preliminary talks on a possible meeting between parliamentarians from North and South Korea took place in Panmunjon. What are the prospects for such a meeting?

In spite of the slow progress of the talks, I am confident and hopeful that they will be continued. The very fact of a continuation of the dialogue seems important to me. It is a realistic approach, though the way may be long and thorny. As you know, it is the first meeting between North and South in the last 34 months. So in the sense of continuing the dialogue it is very meaningful.

Given a favourable international situation and the support of the socialist countries, we can hope for an early and peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. Yet I think that Korean reunification will not come quickly and simply, as we have lived for a long time under different ideological systems. At present we can only talk about the approach, a sounder approach.

The settlement of a number of regional conflicts has provided favourable prerequisites and a promising international climate for peaceful solution to the Korean problem. I hope it will be a peaceful settlement, and I assume that the Soviet leadership holds the same view.

* * *

Having received in Seoul the text of Mikhail Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk speech, Kim Yong Sam replied to one more question from New Times.

Would you care to comment on the proposals advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev in Krasnoyarsk and on the prospects they have opened up?

These proposals are realistic, timely and feasible. As far as peace in Northeast Asia is concerned, I was very impressed by the idea of a multilateral approach to the question of peace in the region, apart from the suggestion that the bilateral interests of the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the evacuation of their military bases should be settled by those two countries alone.

I think Gorbachev's package of proposals deserves serious study. I should like to stress that the multilateral approach, involving five nations in the region, is very similar to the proposal I put forward for the establishment of a six-nation parliamentary conference.

Since my proposal has the full support of the government and the other opposition parties, Gorbachev's proposals will also find a positive response from our side.

I should like to add that, in view of the reality of the situation in East Asia, any talks would be less effective without the United States. I think, therefore, that if the United States is included in the proposed multilateral dialogue, the prospects for its success will be much brighter.

Interviewer

VLADIMIR OVSYANNIKOV,

our own correspondent

TOKYO-SEOUL

■

QUOTATIONS

Franc Setinc,
member of the
Presidium,
Central Committee,
League
of Communists of
Yugoslavia

■ With a view to improving their difficult condition, the Serbs and Montenegrines living in Kosovo are using methods which seem unusual to us, but are quite legal. Meetings as a form of expressing discontent or as an attempt to bring about an effective solution of problems cannot be regarded as unlawful methods. But it's sickening to hear extremist slogans, which sow discord and enmity between the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia. Somebody has written that the meetings being held in Serbia are an expression of the energy of freedom. It would be better if energetic action were taken in solving problems in Kosovo, stabilizing the economy, and improving the pattern of society.

Jerzy Urban,
press spokesman
for the
Polish government

■ The Polish United Workers' Party and its supporters today represent the only force which has a realistic idea of the country's future. We are not afraid of competition. Up till now the opposition has merely criticized what we have been doing. We would like it to adopt a more constructive attitude. We need a constructive opposition in order to make fewer mistakes and do fewer foolish things in the future.

Sosuke Uno,
Foreign Minister
of Japan

■ We would like to work out a concrete programme for Mr Shevardnadze's visit to Japan next December. The forthcomning meeting (at the current General Assembly) is also important as a preparation for subsequent talks in Tokyo. The former policy vis-à-vis the "northern territories" is not changing at all, but it would be expedient for us to change our view of some of the measures being taken by the Soviet Union, including those connected with perestroika and glasnost. For my part, I would like to raise questions relating to such measures and to reach agreement on them in December.

Michaela Geiger,
foreign policy spokesman for the
CDU-CSU faction in the
Bundestag

■ A great deal has changed in Bonn-Moscow relations recently, and a basis for their continued growth has been laid. I regard as decisive the fact that the Soviet Union is abolishing an obstacle that blocked the further progress of bilateral relations for a long time, namely, the extension to West Berlin of all the treaties concluded between the F.R.G. and the Soviet Union. I have felt rather optimistic since this problem was solved in the course of establishing official relations between the European Community and the Eastern economic bloc CMEA. Concessions by Moscow would open up the way for concluding a number of agreements on, for instance, environmental protection, research, technology, and economic cooperation. There is, fo course, nothing sensational in such agreements, but they have great practical importance.

Richard Ullman,
Princeton University
professor
specializing in international
relations, U.S.A.

■ Gorbachev now offers Reagan's successor the opportunity to maintain a deterrent relationship at a substantially lower cost than has been known... He offers the real possibility that something resembling genuine cooperation rather than hostile and destructive competition may become the norm of superpower relations. To explore these possibilities, however, the new U.S. administration must base its approach to Moscow on the assumption that they exist. That in itself would be a significant departure from the patterns of the past.

"Keep your chin up, hawkie! We'll flex our muscles yet!.."
Cartoon by Vsevolod Arsenyev

Edward Heath,
one-time prime minister
of Great Britain

■ Our place is in Europe... We are friends and allies of the United States as Europeans, and that is basic. But we must no longer try to ride both horses at the same time, for as we will increasingly see, we have no influence economically, militarily or politically on the United States. These are realities. We must face them and make a success of the power we can use, which is that of Europe.

Not a good-bye

Galina Sidorova

A Soviet medal for the U.S. President, with smiles and handshakes all round. The ceremony marked the climax of the 29th Shevardnadze-Shultz meeting in three years. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze presented the first of several medals minted in the U.S.S.R. to mark the conclusion of the INF treaty to Ronald Reagan as one of its signatories.

A farewell souvenir? Or a memento of the breakthrough to nuclear disarmament, so difficult for both sides? Or a sidelight on the normal human relationship between the leaders of our two states? Addressing the State Department, the Soviet minister mentioned, by no means in passing, his good personal relationship with George Shultz. Indeed, the human factor has helped to master the principles of the new thinking and served to generate a sense of reality in the bilateral discussions, which the Secretary of State mentioned in my April interview with him. Everything begins and ends with relationships between peple.

Though this Washington meeting may be the last before the November elections, it was not goodbye. Rather the talks between the two ministers and Shevardnadze's conversations with the President and Vice-President reveal a desire to expedite the drafting of agreements and keep the process going up to the last day of the current administration's term of office, so that a foundation can be laid for the new administration. The two sides said they were sure that as the peoples of their two countries backed the constructive dialogue, the policies of the two countries would maintain continuity.

Each new meeting between the ministers serves to raise a corner of the veil shrouding the mysteries in which diplomats are engaged at the Geneva talks. Sometimes the bystander might imagine that nothing happens between these meetings. In fact as it turns out, some 150 controversial issues have been resolved in Geneva over the past two months. True, as many remain, and one reason why the ministers met was to expedite their resolution.

Pending the finalization of a treaty for a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, the Soviet Union has proposed signing an interim agreement not to increase the number of warheads carried by existing types of intercontinental ballistic and submarine-launched missiles. The U.S. has suggested banning codification of telemeterized missile-test data. Both proposals are to be considered shortly in Geneva. Divergences remain as regards sea-launched cruise missiles, with the Americans still regarding on-site inspection of surface ships and submarines as unacceptable. As for the Krasnoyarsk radar station, the U.S. has not so far been prepared to respond to the Soviet proposal to make it a centre for international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space. The joint experiments at Soviet and U.S. nuclear proving ranges have paved the way for finalizing, before the year is out, a coordinated control mechanism for verifying the implementation of the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and the earlier 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. Positions seem to be drawing closer with regard to a convention prohibiting the development and manufacture of chemical weapons. The road appears to be open for an agreed mandate as to forthcoming talks on the reduction of troops and conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals. The two ministers have discussed regional and humanitarian issues and bilateral relations.

Belief in continuity

Such terse and often obscure diplomatic formulae in the joint statement as "the parties have agreed," or "the parties are concerned," are pregnant with future understandings. Steps albeit small ones have been taken towards new agreements. It would seem already to have become regular practice in bilateral relations to set a major target and subsequently, by breaking it down into its components, to move towards achieving it. Hence the optimism generated.

However, perusing the relevant reports, I catch myself thinking that to hear George Shultz, continuity in U.S. policy vis-á-vis the U.S.S.R. is a foregone conclusion, regardless of who enters the White House; to listen to the presidential candidates, one would think that peace should be based on strength, the Russians should be vigilantly watched, and military programmes should be continued along the basic strategic irections, with each candidate professing his own ideas on the matter.

What is one to believe?

I personally think we must make allowances for the rhetoric of the hustings and each candidate's desire to be seen as a "strong man." For such is the rule of the American political game, and it is therefore premature to talk of any new thinking in this respect. "The American voter remains the same. He's looking for strength and he's looking for tomorrow," Mary McGrory, one of the U.S.A.'s most seasoned political analysts, maintains.

But what are we to understand by strength? Is it not too often the practice of politicians on both sides of the fence to simplify it and reduce it to the miltiary aspect? What about economic strength, the strength of reason, of democracy? As recent opinion polls have shown, eight out of every ten American voters advocate contacts in different fields with the Soviet Union, and, as I see it, invest the concept of strength with far more meaning.

As far as we are concerned, perhaps the problem is not exclusively one of American military strength, but also of our own economic upsets? After all, the miscalculations in Soviet domestic and foreign policies at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s largely stemmed from the state of the economy.

I would say that at the Washington meeting progress in bilateral economic relations was least perceptible. This is due both to COCOM's restrictions on the sale of definite categories of Western products to the U.S.S.R. and to Soviet economic level. The stronger the U.S.S.R. grows economically as a result of perestroika and the democratization of Soviet life, the easier it will be for us to reach an understanding with our partner-rivals on all the issues at stake. Coupled with military détente, a firm bilateral economic nexus could pave the way for better Soviet-American relations, and ensure the continuity that the two ministers highlighted in Washington, to ensure which, as I see it, they did everything in their power.

An enemy wanted

Our special correspondent Vladimir Kulistikov interviews a Pakistani general and a leader of the Afghan "irreconcilables" in Islamabad.

Now that the Soviet troops are withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Pakistanis hope for an early end to the war, and the departure of hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees – dangerous rivals in the fight for subsistence in a situation where most local people have no water fit to drink and eat only one meal a day.

But Lieutenant General Kamal Matinuddin (Ret.), a professional political scientist, sees the future differently.

What's coming?

The general is Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Although subsidized by the Pakistani government, the organization stresses its right to choose its own subjects of research. Its findings usually come in for lively comment in the local press, and its seminars are considered a must by every foreign newsman accredited to the Pakistani capital. The lectures delivered by Kamal Matinuddin himself always steal the show. This is not surprising: his analyses invariably provide a clue to what is to be expected from Islamabad in the short term.

I asked Kamal Matinuddin what would happen in Afghanistan after the Soviet troops were withdrawn.

"Unfortunately, the bloodshed will not end," the general replied. "The civil war is going to be a protracted one."

It was an interesting forecast. It suggested a conclusion that neither Kamal Matinuddin nor anyone else in Pakistan, for that matter, is prepared to come to: if the withdrawal of our troops does not bring peace any nearer, then Soviet interference is not the root cause of the conflict, merely only provides the background to it. So what is the problem?

The problem is, he believes, that the Afghan armed opposition is not strong enough. It will never succeed in overthrowing the government in Kabul "in a matter of days," as its leaders have promised. Its chief weakness lies in internal differences, which may eventually develop into a power struggle. The Pakistan-based seven-party alliance with headquarters in Peshawar is hardly likely to find a common language with the Iran-oriented eight-party one. On the territory of Afghanistan proper there are also independent opposition groupings that are hard to come to terms with. The rivalry between the commanders of the armed groupings and those who live in exile and are generously subsidized without risking their lives is also intensifying. Finally, there is no predicting the behavior of traditional tribal chiefs, who have never been particularly obedient to the central authorities.

Pronouncements by high-ranking Pakistanis on the subject of Afghanistan struck me as having one thing in common. All of them refer to the "mujaheddeen" as a totally independent force, the only mouthpiece of the "will of the people" as expressed in some obscure plebiscite. They may have something to do with the West, which supplies arms to them – but not with the Pakistani authorities. I was anxious to meet with some of these people who somehow manage to exist outside space. I found them in Islamabad.

The Seven is spoiling for a fight

Evgeny Alexandrov, a TASS correspondent in Pakistan, and myself were the first Soviet journalists to enter into direct contact with Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, chairman of the alliance of the seven "irreconcilable" Afghan parties (the so-called Peshawar Seven). Each leader of the alliance is permanently domiciled in Islamabad. Gailani's residence is a mansion worth about two million Pakistani rupees, located in one of the better districts of the capital. Armed guards waved us in. We spotted several cars with Peshawar licence plates in the courtyard.

The press secretary with whom we had negotiated for so long by telephone to bring the meeting about, led us to his chief's study. He spoke excellent English and, as far as we could gather, understood some Russian. We found ourselves in a room furnished with a desk and bookshelves. One wall was given over to a large map of Afghanistan, and a rug with a quotation from the Koran embroidered on it in gold.

Was it a place in which a scholar might seek solitude for his reflections? Hardly: the room was rather a relic of our host's past than a part of his present. One of our papers described him as a car-dealer – well, he is not, although he does live by trade. Pir Sayyid Gailani, 55, a graduate of the theological faculty of Kabul University, was elected to the Loya Jirgah (Afghan parliament) on two occasions. In 1963-64 he was involved in drafting the Constitution of Afghanistan, then a monarchy. He advised King Zahir Shah and subsequently President Daoud on Islamic matters. He spent a few days in Moscow in 1960. "A lovely city, good people," he reminisced.

Believed to be a direct descendant of

the prophet Mohammad, Pir Sayyid Gailani has tens of thousands of followers in various Moslem countries. He is head of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, whose armed units' numerical strength is estimated at 18,000. By way of comparison, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar has under him 35,000, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, 20,000 armed men. The latter is to replace Gailani as chairman of the alliance.

We had some difficulty in getting the conversation going. The man seated opposite us, his hair and goatee touched with grey, had a wary look in his eyes. His young aide in modern spectacles was also tense. We explained the purpose of our visit right away: although our attitude to the Afghan armed opposition remained unchanged, we judged it necessary to give Soviet readers an idea of its objectives and views – not as we interpreted them, but straight from the horse's mouth. Our host agreed that it was high time we did so.

"Mr. Gailani, is it possible to achieve a settlement in Afghanistan by political means today?"

"This question should be put to those who started this war. Personally, I think it is much better to settle matters peacefully, through negotiations. We are only fighting against aggression, and we have proved that we can stand up for ourselves."

"Will the withdrawal of Soviet troops bring peace any nearer?"

"Let them take the Kabul leaders along with them. After the Soviet troops are gone, there'll be no room for them in Afghanistan.

"Calls to form the most representative government possible are now coming from all quarters, the Afghan armed opposition included. What do you mean by such a representative government?"

"We of the seven-party alliance have already declared that we are prepared to give Afghanistan such a government. It would comprise representatives of the mujaheddin and refugees, as well as technocrats and bureaucrats, even from the ranks of the PDPA, who have not offended against Islam."

"On what grounds does the alliance claim leadership of the country? Generally speaking, what criteria of legality do you go by?"

"We are ready to call general elections so as to grant the people the right to self-determination. As for the PDPA regime, it is alien to democracy."

"But hasn't the government of the Republic of Afghanistan proclaimed the policy of national reconciliation and offered to share power with the opposition?"

"We do not think that the governmnent you've referred to is in a position to make such an offer. If elections are held, the PDPA is unlikely to get as many as two seats in parliament. The Afghans are very religious. Islam is an important part of their life. They are therefore opposed to the regime which tried to preach communism. Now that the same regime is professing respect for Islam, nobody believes it."

Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani: a moderate among the "irreconcilables"?

"Besides your alliance there are, as everyone knows, other contenders for power in Afghanistan, such as the Iran-based eight-party alliance and the independent opposition groupings in Afghanistan proper."

"They cannot compare with us in fighting capacity. But, in principle, we shall only take over through election."

"The Western press is reporting differences between the alliance leaders and the commanders of the armed formations."

"There are no such differences. In general we do not seek to impose our will on anyone. May those who are fighting now elect their own government in conditions of peace."

"We know what your attitude to the Geneva Accords is. But what do you think about their effect on the situation in Afghanistan?"

"The only positive effect they've had is the withdrawal of Soviet troops. We reject the Geneva Accords because they were signed without us. There are two sides in the conflict – the U.S.S.R. and ourselves. We have already said that we are prepared to discuss all problems with the U.S.S.R. at the negotiating table. We shall never deal with the regime in Kabul."

"What future can you offer the people of Afghanistan?"

"Afghanistan is to become Islamic, democratic, non-aligned. We'll have to undertake postwar reconstruction. We hope the Islamic countries and the free world will give us a helping hand, but without any strings attached. We hope the Soviet Union will help us, too. We are interested in having good relations with our great neighbour."

"Do your partners in the alliance share these views?"

"Yes, we do not have serious differences on that score."

"Like all of the Soviet people, New Times readers are concerned over the fate of our fighting men captured by the Afghan armed opposition. How can their return home be expedited?"

"We have already proposed discussing this issue at the negotiating table and are now waiting for the Soviet side's reply. We have made a goodwill gesture by recently handing over two POWs to representatives of the International Red Cross."

"But they somehow turned out to be just those who don't want to come back."

"We can't order them to."

"But there are other POWs in your hands who are anxious to return home. Why has no goodwill gesture been made with regard to any of those?"

"I repeat, we are prepared to hand over all the POWs to the U.S.S.R., but only through direct negotiations. This is not my private opinion, but that of all the alliance leaders."

And so the armed opposition remains true to itself and to those who arm it. Hard-line anti-communism and implacable hatred for the legitimate government of Afghanistan. It claims to decide from a position of strength what the Afghan people want and what they don't, and has unrealistic confidence in an early military victory, along with a thirst for international recognition demonstrated by the desire to conduct direct negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Union.

This is a position of long standing which has not, however, become more constructive with time. A journalist may well confine himself to such a statement, but politicians must look ahead and seek any opportunity to have our boys released from captivity. True, engineer Rahim, Rabbani's spokesman in Islamabad whom we also met with, assued us that Islam forbade the maltreatment, torture and humiliation of prisoners of war, and that the Soviet POWs were no worse off than the mujaheddin. But those of the boys who have managed to escape and come home tell a different story...

According to the White Book published by Afghanistan's Foreign Ministry, there are about 130 camps in Pakistan where gunmen of the Afghan armed opposition undergo combat training. In Islamabad, I was told there were none. I'd like to find out the truth, but the regions shown on this map are off-limits to Soviet newsmen.

Betting on extremists

Presenting the Seven as fighters against aggression was certainly hypocritical of Gailani. He and his ilk started armed action against the government of Afghanistan long before the arrival of Soviet troops there. It is enough to say that by the summer of 1978 the "irreconcilables" had pitched over 30 camps on the territory of Pakistan, where thousands of gunmen underwent combat training. Gailani is known as a moderate. Hikmatyar, the leader of the Hezb-e-Islami party, is an extremist and fundamentalist who wants the mujaheddin in power to the exclusion of all other groups, call the U.N.'s good offices and Diego Cordovez's mediation "interference in internal affairs," and describes the BBC, whose broadcasts are not always to his liking, as "the voice of Satan."

It is feared in many Western capitals that if the mujaheddin prevail in Afghanistan the country will become another seat of Islamic fundamentalism. But it is Hikmatyar the fundamentalist who remains the principal recipient of Western aid. What is behind this paradox? The Western journalists to whom I put the question back in Moscow laid all the blame on the Soviet Union, whose interference, they allege, had turned the whole of the armed opposition into extremists, leaving the West no option but to rely on them in countering "Soviet expansion."

Actually, the West had more than one alternative to choose from. The armed opposition is not homogeneous. The August issue of the monthly news letter published by the Afghan Information Centre – an emigrant research and propaganda organization based in Peshawar – came my way recently. Hikmatyar's wrath is said to have cost its former leader his life. This probably explains why no article in the bulletin is signed. The author of one piece comes down on extremism in the ranks of the mujaheddin. "These groups," he writes, "well-armed, financed and organized, can create obstacles to the establishment of a complete, representative system of government in Afghanistan. These groups have reached the conclusion that they cannot take power by political means. Hence, the continuation of war in Afghanistan is the continuation of their life." Further on, the author all but laments the withdrawal of Soviet troops: "If the Russians withdraw from Afghanistan and the war continues, it will give the impression to the free world that the Afghans are merely wild people intent on killing each other."

The implication is that we are pulling out too early. We ought to have waited until the armed opposition had pulled its own extremists into line and closed its ranks...

Behind the scenes

It seemed to me as if the U.S.S.R. determination to carry through its commitments under the Geneva Accords came as an unpleasant surprise to a number of Pakistani politicians. Reading statements by conservative politicians in the local papers, one can't help feeling that they are clearly going to miss our military presence in the neighbouring country. They are accustomed to regarding the Soviet Union and the legitimate government of Afghanistan as their enemies, and they do not want the chance offered by Geneva for a settlement in Afghanistan and better understanding to be used.

Pretexts for keeping the "enemy image" alive are chosen without undue scruple. Without bothering to wait for the findings of the official inquiry to come through, Fazle Haq, Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, accused Moscow and Kabul of having had a hand in the tragic death of President Zia ul-Haq. Some Cabinet members also imply as much.

The "enemy at our door" syndrome shows not only in words, but in actions as well. For instance, "barbarous bombings" of Pakistani population centres by planes intruding from the North have been reported. U.N. observers went over to take a look but found no witnesses of the air raid. True, there were ruins all right, but the destruction had been carried out on the ground...

Or take the story of the downed Afghan plane. The wreckage was never found. It transpired last week that it had been looked for on the territory of Afghanistan! Someone is offering the leaders of armed gangs good money for the "remains" of Soviet and Afghan combat vehicles.

An atmosphere of fear is being built up in which a "retaliation blow" would be a logical response to "violations." It is true that a large proportion of Pakistan's population is not succumbing to panic. The independent papers occasionally make caustic remarks in connection with the air force command's regular reports on "combat successes." But the dangerous thing is that Washington, a close ally of Islamabad's and a guarantor of the Geneva Accords, is turning a deaf ear to the Pakistani capital's threats to "revise its Afghan policy," i.e., go back on the principles agreed on in Geneva. There are probably forces in the West which, disappointed by the mujaheddin's performance, would have nothing against Pakistan perpetrating direct aggression against its neighbour.

Why are some influential quarters in Pakistan so interested in keeping up the "external threat" scare? Air Force Marshal Azghar Khan (Retd.), leader of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal party, one of the most intelligent men I met in Pakistan, gave me his answer. He believes the country's foreign policy to be aimed, in principle, at making enemies rather than friends. This is due to the role the army has to play on the Pakistani political scene. The military are apt to look at foreign policy from the angle of their own status. They need international tension and troubled borders – after all, if peace is durable what's the use of spending so much on the army and its weapons?

But is it only the military that make Pakistan's policy what it is today?

(to be continued)

ISLAMABAD-MOSCOW

Photos by Yevgeny Alexandrov and author

Forecasts prove wrong, but...

The annual session of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) opened in Geneva's Palais des Nations on September 19.

As distinct from the first half of the 1980s, lately this international economic forum has met in a world economic situation free of serious upheavals. The gloomy forecasts of a chain reaction of bankruptcies and a decline in output and investment likely to be triggered off in the major capitalist countries by last year's stock exchange crashes and, consequently, of a world economic recession, have proved wrong. Though the growth rate of world industrial output has not been high this year, it is not lower than it was last year (see table below), and there is so far no danger of a sharp fall-off in world trade. The volume of exports is expected to rise by 5.3 per cent (as compared with 5.9 per cent in 1987).

Favourable business activity is being maintained thanks to the economic upturn that has now been in evidence for five years in the industrial capitalist and developing countries of Southeast Asia and in China. In the rest of the world the economic situation varies from region to region. The African countries have not yet extricated themselves from deep crisis. The pace of economic activity is slowing down in Latin America. Economic growth rates in the European socialist countries fell last year, but will rise again this year.

This survey of the world economic situation is contained in the Trade and Development Report, 1988, presented for the first time by UNCTAD Secretary-General Kenneth Dadzie at a recent press conference in Moscow. It formed the basis for discussions between the delegations of 129 countries taking part in the Geneva session of the Trade and Development Board. The main points on the agenda are the interdependence of trade, development and the international monetary and finacial system, and the external debts of the Third World nations.

This interdependence is not a new problem. Properly speaking, it was to resolve this problem on a global scale that the U.N. Conference was set up in 1964. However, it has not been possible to resolve it in the course of the past 24 years. Moreover, it is being aggravated even in the relatively favourable world economic situation that obtains today. As was the case 24 years ago, the root of the problem lies in the unequal position of Third World states in the world economy.

This unequal position is manifested primarily in conditions for trade. According to UNCTAD estimates, after a certain improvement in 1987, the conditions for trade between developing and industrial countries have again deteriorated this year. And this concerns not only the countries that export raw materials whose earnings have been reduced by the fall in prices. Having become competitive exporters of finished products, developing nations are facing growing trade protectionism on Western markets. They are unable to compete with transnational corporations. That is why, UNCTAD believes, it is especially important today to fulfil an international commitment made a long time ago – to open up the markets of the industrial countries to exports of finished products from developing states. This would enable the latter to increase their foreign currency earnings for the purpose of development and the repayment of their external debts.

When the embargo on the contents of the UNCTAD report was lifted on September 2, the main news contained in reports from Geneva was the conclusion that the risk of default among heavily indebted developing nations is today greater than in the entire period since the debt crisis began in 1982. In the opinion of UNCTAD, without a 30 per cent reduction in the bank debts of developing countries they will be unable to extricate themselves from the debt noose.

The debt problem is being aggravated by the fact that the Western banks have neither the capacity nor willingness to finance Third World nations. This was revealed in a letter to the chairmen of the International Monetary Fund in mid-September by Horst Schulmann, managing director of the Institute of International Finance, which unites 183 leading Western banks and business corporations.

Having called on the IMF to pay special attention to the debt problem, Horst Schulmann suggested increasing the volume of credits extended to debtor nations on favourable terms. Leading New York bankers have also recently pointed to the need to write off some of the debts. The IMF session that is to open in West Berlin in a few days will show whether the IMF and leading Western bankers respond to this call. It may well be that the aggravation of the painful debt problem will compel them not to take half-measures any longer but to display a responsible approach to finding a solution, for on this the future of the world economy depends.

In this connection I recall my conversation in Geneva with UNCTAD Secretary-General Kenneth Dadzie, who was inspired by the results of the Seventh Session of the Conference in 1987. Speaking of the role and tasks of UNCTAD, he drew my attention especially to the question of the responsibility of all members of the world community for the state of affairs in the world economy and the need to do all they can to maintain economic growth and development. Kenneth Dadzie had a high opinion of the Soviet Union's efforts in attempting to check the arms race and its proposal to use the funds released as a result of disarmament measures for development.

It became clear at the international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development in the summer of this year that the major Western powers are not yet prepared to assume responsibility for such a radical solution of military, political, monetary and financial problems. Some of the developing nations are not prepared for this either. The discussions in the Trade and Development Board will show whether their position on this question has changed and, if it has, in what direction.

Felix Goryunov

The dynamics of world industrial ouput
(percentage change)

	1980-85	1987	1988*	1989**
world total	2.8	3.1	3.1	2.9
developed market-economy countries				
socialist countries of Eastern Europe	2.5	3.0	2.7	2.4
socialist countries of Asia	3.4	2.6	4.1	3.8
developing countries by regions:	9.6	9.4	7.8	7.5
Latin America	1.8	2.8	3.1	3.3
North Africa	0.7	2.2	2.2	2.5
other Africa	1.6	1.1	2.3	2.5
West Asia	2.0	2.2	2.7	2.6
South Asia	0.7	0.5	0.9	1.2
East Asia	5.5	2.4	5.2	5.4
	5.0	8.1	6.3	6.3

*estimated **forecasts

Data taken from the UNCTAD report

The tropical giant on the rise

Igor Fesunenko

Any mention of Brazil with its 140-million-strong population immediately brings to mind the usual associations: coffee, football, exotic Rio de Janeiro where everyone wears white trousers.

On the other hand, from headlines in the papers another equally traditional but very different list is formed: narcomafia and crime, favelas, poverty and illiteracy, the dying-out of the Indians, the merciless destruction of the Amazonian forests, the astronomical foreign debt, and the plundering of the country by transnational corporations and American imperialism.

So one can understand and sympathize with Brazilians when they complain that the foreign press and correspondents are obsessed with negative aspects of Brazilian life and overlook the rest. For instance, that in the volume of industrial production the country comes 8th in the capitalist world and is determined to overtake Canada and Italy in the nineties and become a member of the "big seven" led by the U.S. and Japan. And that's not at all surprising when one remembers that for the past two decades Brazil has had the world's fastest developing economy.

Vicissitudes of Brazilian businessmen

The 3.5 per cent industrial growth rate last year was seen by some specialists as a catastrophic backslide. That seems no exaggeration when one recalls that in 1972 the growth rate was 12 and in 1973 14 per cent.

Yes, Brazil has now entered a period of stagnation, but in the past five years its steel output has risen by 50 per cent, coal output by 35, crude oil by 200, and aluminium by 180 per cent. Despite the extremely unfavourable situation on the domestic market caused by a sharp fall in the population's purchasing power, the production of cars in the first half of the eighties rose by 60 per cent.

However, we know well today that record steel or pig iron outputs do not necessarily bring with them general prosperity, that leading the world in the production of combines does not guarantee an abundance of grain or a successful solution to the food programme, if the combines do not have the necessary quality and reliability. But the quality of the TV sets and video recorders manufactured at Brazilian factories compares with those made in Japan, that of footwear with shoes made in Italy and of textiles with those of French manufacture.

Having got used to automatically relegating Brazil to the rank of a developing country, one often overlooks the fact

A bird's eye view of São Paulo

that the tropical giant has already joined the club of 11 nations possessing the technology for the full cycle of uranium enrichment, that it can launch satellites, and lies tenth in the production of cars, which, as our car makers are constrained to admit, are one degree better in their technical level and quality than any produced in Gorky, Togliatti or Moscow.

When ordinary people are unaware of these facts or overlook them, it can arouse only pity. But when responsible officials at the former Ministry for Foreign Trade thought and, even worse, acted for years on that level, it produced disastrous results. The volume of trade between the two countries, despite a perceptible increase in recent years, fluctuates somewhere around 250 million rubles a year. Which is, of course, very little when one considers the potentials of the domestic markets.

We could to some extent compensate for more than just the shortcomings of our footwear and clothing industries by buying excellent Brazilian shoes and clothing in exchange for our oil. But another highly promising field of trade and cooperation is information science. That view has already been maintained for a quarter of a century (with a short break) by the Moscow representative of the Brazilian firm Interbras, Obertal Mantovanelli Netto. I have known him for a long time. I admire the persistence with which he devotes himself to expanding Soviet-Brazilian economic and trade ties, and can easily understand his disappointment when he learned that in the newly created Soviet Ministry for Foreign Economic Ties, Brazil has been relegated to the Department of African and Latin American Countries, which formally at least predetermines the same approach to our trade and economic links with Brazil as, say, with Swaziland or the Seychelles.

Not for nothing did Obertal Mantovanelli mention information science. That is a field in which our two countries could cooperate very fruitfully: after long delays we are at last beginning to realize the role of computers in contemporary life, and the need has arisen to provide our schools, and not just our schools, with personal computers.

U.S. resentment

Brazil has already made very impressive progress in the production of personal computers, although it has paid for it by provoking irritation, displeasure and even sanctions on the part of the U.S. The small but intense tariff war began in 1984 when, wishing to protect its own budding computer industry, the Brazilian government restricted access to foreign made mini-computers and microcalculators on its domestic market. That aroused the anger of American companies, who thus lost a rich market. In November 1987, President Reagan announced the introduction of trade sanctions against Brazil in the form of additional customs tariff on Brazilian goods.

Brazil today is an industrialized country which makes aircraft, among other things

That naturally produced anger and indignation in Brazil. Less than a year later, on July 22, 1988, Washington announced its intention to introduce additional sanctions on a number of traditional Brazilian exports to the U.S. to a sum total of 200 million dollars. The direct cause for this next blow from its great northern neighbour was Brazil's refusal to ensure the proper protection of the patent rights (in other words to pay for the patents) of the American pharmaceutical companies that controlled almost a third of the medicine output in Brazil and were raking in astronomical profits.

I have cited only two examples of the sharp aggravation of American-Brazilian relations in recent years. To them one can add nuclear power problems (Westinghouse delivered to the Brazilian Angra-1 nuclear power plant a reactor that specialists described as "rotten goods"), the trade in arms (Washington was unable to forgive Brazil's arms sales to a number of regimes hostile to the U.S., specifically Lybia, and Brazil in return recalled attempts to make secret arms sales to Iran), foreign policy doctrines, especially with regard to the conflict in Central America: Brazil categorically opposes outside interference in the affairs of the region. The magazine Veja said recently: "It is hard to pinpoint a single issue on which the two countries, which 20 years ago were close allies, would today take a similar stand."

Indeed, shortly after the 1964 military coup energetically backed by the United States, which brought to power a right-wing military regime, one of its active organizers and participants, Foreign Minister Juracy Magalhães, whose life, activities and interests were closely linked with Wall Street, publicly declared: "What is good for the U.S. is good for Brazil." And now two decades later, the U.S. permanent delegate at the U.N., Vernon Walters, is forced to note with irritation that in 1986 Brazil voted against U.S. proposals on vital items of the U.N. agenda in 70 per cent of the cases. Mr Walters' disenchantment and bitterness include a deeply personal element: in 1964 when he was with the U.S. military attaché in Brazil, he was one of the most active inspirers of the coup, a personal friend and, naturally, adviser of its commanders.

The price of inflated ambition

It was the incompetent and arrogant generals, who seized power in 1964, and those who took over later and acted on "after us the deluge" principle, who are chiefly to blame for the fact that the country has a record foreign debt, which already exceeds 120 thousand million dollars. Three and a half years ago the bankrupt generals, under strong public pressure, were forced to leave the stage. But for a long time to come the nation will still have to pay far too high a price for their rule: beset by difficult economic and social problems (inflation,

an unbalanced budget, a soaring consumer price index: 390 per cent a year) Brazil has found itself in an almost deadened situation without the money to repay not only the debt, but even the interest on it, which amounts to 12 thousand million a year.

The gravity of the situation can be judged from the fact that in the three and a half years that the government of President Jose Sarney has been in office the post of finance minister has changed hands three times, and now the fourth holder of the post, Mailson da Nobrega, is heroically seeking a solution to problems that cannot be solved by therapeutic methods. Each proposed his own solutions, formulated his own recipes and, following them, tried to find a way out of the labyrinth of very difficult socio-economic problems. But despite the changes in ministers, one has to give President Sarney his due – he has invariably consistently and as a matter of principle categorically insisted that repayment of the foreign debt should under no circumstances fall as an additional burden on the shoulders of rank-and-file Brazilians. To this end in February 1987, the government proclaimed a moratorium on its debt repayments, which aroused the fury of its creditors, especially on Wall Street, and led to a new aggravation of relations with Washington. Only in June of this year, thanks to the efforts of Mailson da Nobrega, was a compromise reached: an agreement was signed on refinancing the interest on the Brazilian foreign debt with the committee of foreign creditor banks. Having abandoned its moratorium, Brazil will receive another 5,200 million dollars, from which it will pay the interest on previous loans, as well as a short-term credit for 600 million dollars.

...This brings to mind the pitiful image of a traveller who, finding himself in a bog, tries to pull one foot out while leaning on the other, which gradually sinks in deeper and more hopelessly.

Generals back to barracks

In the political sphere in recent years Brazil has been confidently advancing towards the democratization of government and public institutions, building a law-governed state that provides its citizens with reliable safeguards of their political rights and freedoms.

Since March 1985, a so-called transitional civilian government has been in office. It was supposed to have been headed by Tancredo Neves, whom Congress had elected President. But Tancredo Neves fell ill and died only a day before he was due to take office, so it was Vice-President Jose Sarney who was sworn in. A rapid process of renewal began in Brazil: the national constituent assembly is completing the draft of a new constitution, which, after approval on October 5, promises to turn Brazil into one of the most democratic countries in the West. Incidentally, it would be useful for us in the Soviet Union, as we discuss ways of forming a new law-governed society, to take a look at some of the ideas being implemented in Brazil. For instance, the new Brazilian constitution gives citizens the right to appeal to courts against the authorities if they infringe on their constitutional rights. And I mean authorities, not just officials, right up to government level.

In addition, the Brazilian constitution has approved the principle of so-called "people's action," which gives a group of people the right to annul decisions taken by the government if they are detrimental to their interests. This principle, which at a first glance seems to be overbold and to undermine the prerogatives of the government, applies to the morals of administrative officials, the historical and cultural heritage, and protection of the environment.

...Studies of positive foreign experience not only enrich our own outlook, but help do away with the syndrome of great power narcissism.

Take also a field of such vital importance for any country as the social welfare of the population. Here too the draft of the new Brazilian constitution offers us much food for thought.

It turns out that the deputies to Brazil's Constituent Assembly have discussed and approved the principle of index-number pensions (i.e., automatic increments in line with the rising cost of living); for wages this principle has been in operation for a long time, and it wouldn't occur to anyone to encroach on it.

Some other interesting and instructive details merit the attention of those in charge of our State Committee for Labour and Social Issues, social security services and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions: each pensioner in Brazil will receive a "thirteenth" pension for the New Year (for those in work, a 13th month's wage was introduced long ago). Workers taking their annual holiday receive not only their average for the past year, but 33 per cent more. If the 120-day maternity leave to which Brazilian women are entitled doesn't surprise us, we can still admire the clause in the Brazilian constitution, which gives a 5-day paid paternity leave so that the father can meet his wife and baby and spend the first and most difficult days after leaving the maternity home with them...

And another extremely important measure that ensures the social protection of the most destitute Brazilians: old people (over the age of 60) and invalids (even if they have never worked) are entitled to a pension that cannot be less than the minimum wage established by law for working people.

These social gains, unprecedented in the history of the country, which have been given legal enactment in the new constitution, have predictably led to anxiety, protests and resistance from military circles and employers. The capitalists are indignant that the working people should have such social welfare, and specifically oppose the right to strike and the compulsory compensation payments to factory and office workers (from the 13th month's wage to the quadruple redundancy payment). The military are starting to talk of a "threat from the left." And not just to talk: at the end of last year a Brazilian Association for the Defence of Democracy was formed in Rio de Janeiro. It includes in its ranks senior officials of the former military regimes, among them former President, General Figueiredo, and three military ministers. The paper Correio Brasiliense, published in the capital, believes that this association can be regarded as the rallying point for all those who favour a new military coup along the lines of 1964. Immediately after the association was set up, its organizers held a press conference at which they called for the army to intervene in political life in order to prevent Brazil moving to the left. In this connection, many Brazilians recalled General Figueiredo's notorious phrase while still in power, which revealed clearly the true nature of his "democracy." The general said that he preferred the smell of horses to the smell of a human crowd.

The Constituent Assembly refused to budge unfer this fierce attack.

Traditions and new thinking

In general there is a growing and strengthening feeling of optimism in the country, belief in the future and a determination to defend the political and social gains of the past few years. It came

home to me as I compared today's Brazil with what it had been in the 1960s. In January, when I revisited the country, several Brazilians from different sections of society made interesting comparison between the processes taking place in our two countries. Indeed, when the reactionary military coup took place in Brazil in 1964, there was also a change of leadership in the Soviet Union, marking the beginning of what we now describe as the period of stagnation. The bankruptcy of the military dictatorship (1985) almost coincided, as many Brazilians observe, with the beginning in our country of perestroika, renewal and the development of democracy and glasnost.

A salesman in the bookshop Freitas Bastos in Rio de Janeiro wondered if that was the reason for the immense and unexpected success of Mikhail Gorbachev's book "Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World"? It was published in Brazil in November of last year and immediately became a bestseller, for several months firmly held first place among the non-fiction titles, and today, a year later, still remains on the list of the ten most sought-after books in Brazil. Great interest is felt today in all spheres of Brazilian society in the processes at work in our country. The official visit to Brazil a year ago by Eduard Shevardnadze provided a powerful impulse for the development of Soviet-Brazilian ties. The coming official visit to the Soviet Union of President Jose Sarney will undoubtedly accelerate the development of political, economic and other ties between the two great countries. More so, both countries' views are either similar or identical. President Sarney himself has repeatedly expressed hope of further progress in the all-round development of Soviet-Brazilian relations.

Such an optimistic view of the future rests reliably on the perceptible similarity or even kinship between the main principles in our new thinking and the convictions of the Brazilian people: a sincere desire for peace. By nature and conviction, as well as by their national traditions, the Brazilians are ardent pacifists in the best sense of that word. Osny Duarte Pereira, an eminent lawyer and legal expert, once told me that in the 19th century Brazil was the first (and the only) country in the world to have a constitution that categorically forbade the government to resort to the use of force in settling any international disputes. What a fine legal and ethical precedent, what a wonderful contribution to the history of modern civilization!...

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Photos from National Geographic (U.S.A.)

The army, the opposition and the nation's future

The situation in Burma remains very tense. The army is restoring peace and law and order.

The army takeover led by Defence Minister So Maung, 59, appears to have completely abolished the one-party military bureaucratic system established by the military in 1962. Since then the country had been run by General Ne Win, the founder and leader of the Burma Socialist Programme Party and effective ruler of the nation. The latest measures by senior army officers are believed to have been orchestrated by Ne Win, who is still in control behind the scenes, though officially he resigned from his post as chairman of the party in July this year.

The army officers have formed a cabinet headed by So Maung, who has retained the defence portfolio and has also been named foreign minister. They have also announced their immediate objectives: to restore peace and law and order, do away with economic anarchy, organize transport, and supply the population with food. The new government has legalized political parties and declared in principle for democratic multiparty elections. It has dissolved the local people's councils set up under the Constitution of 1974, which had effectively been annulled. The army has disbanded the strike committees, which had in recent weeks exercised administrative functions in many parts of the country.

The political role of the Burmese army can hardly be judged by universally accepted criteria, without taking the country's specific conditions into account. In spite of its corporate and caste character, which has become more pronounced in the past few years, the Burmese army has been able to preserve the basic spirit and traditions of the national liberation struggle. Most of the elderly officers who took an active part in it have already retired. However, they still exercise considerable influence on younger officers and on all servicemen. Patriotism, loyalty to their country and the defence of its interests remain vital elements in the educational work conducted in the Burmese army and its schools and colleges.

The new military rulers are generals and colonels of the second generation of Burmese officers. As officers, they came to maturity after the winning of independence. For Burma, this was the initial and dangerous period of the struggle against the insurgent movement and the invasion of Guomindang divisions. In their moral qualities they were close to the veterans of the national liberation movement who helped them move up through the ranks. These officers see army unity not simply as a corporate principle but as an important condition for national unity and territorial integrity of the country.

So Maung stressed after the coup that if the armed forces break up, "the state can lose its independence, and we, together with all the people, will have to face grave dangers that cannot be foreseen." It should be admitted that stabilization of the political and food situation, advanced by the military as a priority task, meets the interests of the entire people. This is, indeed, essential for the normal holding of democratic elections.

In other words, the army leaders proceeded from the real danger of a crisis that jeopardized Burma's national interests. But the methods of normalizing the political situation have remained undemocratic and repressive. This has naturally triggered off protests on the part of the opposition and made the prospect of establishing a relationship with it, let alone cooperation, far less likely.

The army takeover has preempted the opposition's demand for the abolition of

the one-party system and the dissolution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party government. However, the principal demand – to transfer power to an interim government to be formed by the opposition, and hence send the army back to barracks – hangs in the air. The takeover has shown that in any future multi-party structure, the army intends, as it did before the 1962 coup, to act not as an instrument of politicians but as a significant and, perhaps, independent political factor defending both its own and the national interests.

The opposition has responded to the army's political challenge by organizing mass protests in Rangoon and many other cities. Barricades and obstacles have been erected in the streets, and bloody clashes have taken place between troops and virtually unarmed protesters. Hundreds of people were killed. However, neither side has achieved decisive success.



The streets of Burmese cities are controlled by troops

Reuters-TASS photo

The Burmese character has manifested itself vividly during the struggle between the two camps. Buddhist restraint, calm, kindness, tact and patience are the most characteristic traits of the people who inhabit the fertile valleys of the Irrawaddy and Sittang rivers. But when an uncompromising struggle begins, other traits – irrepressible anger, furious pressure, and even medieval brutality – prevail. The unbridled passions of the mob have flared up repeatedly in the last two months of the struggle, in which, incidentally, the peasants (who make up two thirds of the population) have taken almost no part at all.

In a fit of rage, demonstrators, with many declassed elements among them, tortured and summarily executed policemen and soldiers they had captured. There have even been cases of cannibalism – a revival of an ancient ritual practised in Burma at the dawn of civilization.

Stories are being told of the almost complete massacre of members of BSPP district committees in various parts of the country. Membership of the ruling party has become dangerous for its full-time workers, and many have gone into hiding to save their lives. Many of the civil servants who refrained from taking part in the anti-government demonstrations that have swept through Burmese towns are being subjected to crude pressure with threats of physical violence.

Many adult demonstrators brought their children, who were often killed when troops opened fire. I was very surprised one day in the centre of Rangoon to see a boy of four or five being led by his elder sister. Raising his fist, he constantly shouted the slogan of the day, "Down with the one-party system! Our cause is just!"

The struggle for democracy and against tyranny and violence is proceeding in a way that is painful for the people. The "side" effects of this process are unprecedented chaos, anarchy and marauding. The events have hit hard at the townspeople driven to despair by soaring prices and the lack of essential goods, especially food. Those who have relatives in the countryside try to solve their own food problem with their help.

The situation is particularly difficult in Rangoon, where the delivery of food has been sharply curtailed because of lack of fuel, looting, and sabotage by the opposition and officials. The endless general strikes have paralyzed economic life.

Some opposition members seem to have been guided by the principle "the worse, the better." But this is a grave delusion. Was it not chaos and anarchy that impelled the army to take severe measures to restore public order?

The army is a real political force in Burma, and politicians have to reckon with it. Division in the army would merely aggravate chaos, anarchy and violence. Incidentally, the armed insurgent struggle is still in progress in the outlying areas of the country. Nevertheless, it appears that some opposition circles would like to see the army leadership divided as many Burmese make no distinction between anarchy and democracy. Arbitrariness and anarchy are often seen here as signs of democracy, the content of which is not deeply examined.

Asked how they understood democracy, ordinary people in Rangoon replied: "For me democracy means cheap rice." But continuing chaos and violence will not lead to a reduction in prices. For this it is necessary to stabilize the political and economic situation in towns, especially in the capital. This is an essential national task, and no political force looks as if it will be able to cope with it singlehanded.

Political developments in Burma are now extremely complex. The movement launched by students and backed up by other strata has roused the whole nation and is essentially progressive. But the genuine aims of the heterogeneous social and class forces involved in it have not yet been clearly defined. The opposition's slogan calling for the transfer of power to it for the purpose of stabilization does not strike me as realistic.

The citizens of Rangoon, as well as all Burmese people, will clearly have to cooperate with the army in the immediate national task of achieving stability. Political ambitions will not benefit any group. Only by normalizing the situation through the efforts of society as a whole will it be possible to ensure the success of free and fair elections leading to the establishment of a multi-party system in Burma.

Fyodor Chamovskikh
RANGOON–MOSCOW

The unknowns in the "survival equation"

Vladimir Pryakhin
Cand. Sc. (Hist.)

The list of potential global dangers to mankind's existence has been considerably extended. How to stave them off?

Suddenly our world is being beset with such pressing problems as damage to the environment, holes in the ozone layer, the danger of a likely change in the climate of the planet, and others.

We have made many discoveries of late – for instance that felling a few acres of trees in one country may tell on the climate worldwide.

We have become accustomed to such "revelations" as the alphabet of the new thinking. However, there is also a science of political thinking for the 21st century... I recall asking Academician Raushenbakh in February 1987 to comment on the words "perhaps the only one in the Universe", pronounced by Mikhail Gorbachev at his meeting in the Kremlin with participants in the Moscow Peace Forum with respect to civilization on the planet Earth. The statement sounded strange to me. I had never seriously studied either astrophysics or cosmology, but I believed that even the miniscule possibility that extraterrestrial civilizations could exist becomes a reality at some points in the infinite Universe, as stated in Bernoulli's law of large numbers.

"Indeed, no one has disproved Bernoulli's theorem of the macrocosm," Boris Raushenbakh explained, "but scientists are rather puzzled that in spite of all their efforts they have failed to discover any signs of civilization anywhere in the Universe, and this in itself makes one wonder... A German scientist, I believe, has given a very interesting mathematical explanation of this phenomenon. Iosif Shklovsky too has shared his theory, though he has emphasized that a different philosophical interpretation should be provided for it," the Academician told me.

Reading Shklovsky's work, I found that the "interesting interpretation" is that of Sebastian von Hoerner, and so to the effect that the lives of civilizations, once they possess the technological capacity to maintain interplanetary contacts, only last very short periods of time. In other words, our postulated more developed partners are already extinct, while we have not yet developed the technology to enable us to make contact with less developed civilizations. Thus, civilizations, having reached a certain "technological maturity," begin to develop at a catastrophic pace and burn "like matchwood." Extrapolating natural tendencies in the development of technological civilizations, the American futurologist A. Rappaport estimates that global catastrophes in the history of mankind will have taken place "not later than by 2030."

In this case we are interested not so much in Rappaport's forecasts as in how they were judged by Shklovsky, who regarded as "quite reasonable" the idea that a technologically developed civilization has a limited lifespan. Here Shklovsky emphasized that we are dealing strictly with the aspect of theoretical probability.

Though purely mathematical, the essence of the theory, enunciated by American astrophysicists in September 1971 at the first Soviet-American conference on extraterrestrial civilizations in Armenia, speaks of the inevitable explosion of the man-made "technosphere." This is a science of the new thinking. One can talk till the cows come home of the dangers of this or that global catastrophe threatening our civilization but, apart from having a certain positive effect, it creates the illusion that solving individual, local problems will help find a way out of "the emergency situation" on the spaceship called Earth.

Indeed, it has now become difficult to identify the most dangerous problem. Moreover, the human race may not yet be conscious of some of the issues that challenge man on the threshold of the third millennium. In other words, if the right side of our "survival equation" contains a large zero, the left-hand side, along with the known values A (nuclear holocaust), B (ecological disaster), C (population explosion) and so on, contains the n-number of x and y quantities, whose contents and the very fact of whose existence may remain unknown to us; as, for example, late on the evening of April 25, 1986 we were unaware of what was to happen in Chernobyl two-to-three hours later.

This is the problem in its general expression. The answer to this problem, also in its general expression, was given clearly and authoritatively at the 27th CPSU Congress: "We cannot take 'no' for an answer to the question: will mankind survive or not? We say: the progress of society, the life of civilization must and will continue."

What are the practical steps leading to the implementation of this comprehensive political directive?

Scientific thought recognizes no taboos

There is a view that the best way to survive in conditions of "high technological development" would be to limit scientific research in certain fields, a sort of "ban" or "taboo" before which scientists would meekly bow. The idea, stemming from good intentions, seems, however, hardly feasible. Firstly, scientific thought recognizes no taboos. Secondly, it is very difficult to work out a more or less universal system of restrictions on scientific research. Towards the end of the century, 90 per cent of the gainfully employed population in the developed countries will work in the information sphere. Even if only one tenth of this potential is employed in scientific research, this means tens of millions of highly skilled researchers armed with the most advanced information technology.

One could, of course, try to retrain them as dressmakers and barbers, but even then, given the conditions of the information revolution, it would be no problem for such a "barber" to tamper on the quiet with the human genome, considering that even today any Western researcher can, using a personal computer in the comfort of his own home, enter the libraries of Harvard and Yale or exchange views with colleagues in Berne and Kyoto.

Control over scientific research is certainly needed. As Belinsky put it, "police

order" is needed in touching the high-level technologies of the 21st century, so that the touch will always be competent and well-intentioned. Now we stand in need of a new, higher standard in running the world, some World International (or Parliament) of people of good will united with the objective of facilitating the survival of civilization, and coordinating their actions to this end.

As for deciding the fate of mankind in the decades ahead, much will depend on how modern science is able, with political backing, to offer humanity a positive alternative for development that is scientifically well-grounded and globally attractive.

Here we intrude on an area that is "taboo" outside a competent circle of people. The fact remains, however, that in science a new situation has evolved, the essence of which is that no problems exist that it will not be able to solve in the foreseeable future. Take, for instance, the problem of extra-longevity or, as it is formulated by the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, "an artificial increase in the longevity of the human species."

Drawing by Vladimir Nenashev

In Western scientific quarters, this problem is being discussed fairly extensively. From a biological point of view, there is nothing unrealistic about living forever, writes editor-in-chief Daniel Koshland in the magazine Science.

"Forever" may be a more distant goal in science. But isn't a considerable extension of longevity over decades or perhaps centuries a breathtaking objective which could unite billions of people on the conceptual ground of the new thinking?

This objective was once stated by the founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, who at the same time thought it unrealistic because of the hazards of the population explosion. Mankind could not stand the infinite prolongation of all human lives born on Earth for long, he opined, and a situation in which the lives of all citizens could go on for all eternity is unthinkable.

The biology of aging is only one side of the scientific and technological revolution today. When mastered, the fundamental level of research enabling man to control the process of aging will provide him with the ability to influence other vital processes.

Handing down memory

At the Science, Technology and Peace world forum in Moscow in 1986, Professor Elena Burlakova put forward the hypothesis that science could develop to a level at which it will be possible to hand down human memory from generation to generation. If man ever conquers death, the resultant population growth will be made up for by a natural adjustment of the birth rate. Incidentally, this hypothesis is altogether compatible with Vernadsky's theory of the noosphere, that is, the interaction between the environment and society, where the rational intellectual activity of man is the major decisive factor in development.

From the point of view of the noosphere, there is no great difference between past, present and future generations of mankind. All these have meaning only as vehicles of information about the surrounding Universe. The life of each individual is defined in the noosphere by specific existence coordinates – space, time, content and quality of life.

The prospects of the modern information revolution permit us to expect it to be possible, using these coordinates, to create fairly complete models of preceding generations. At the dawn of the century, the Russian philosopher A. Rozhkov claimed that a higher level of science would enable us to extrapolate the genetic pattern for any human being from a picture or the description of his person.

But neither A. Rozhkov nor his followers could have predicted the technical form their project may take. Some of its features can be seen in today's computer technology. While in the early 1980s the manual synthesis of a gene consisting of 120 nucleotides took a whole year, the computer-aided process now makes it possible to do this in three days. More than 350,000 genetic sequences had been identified by 1981, thus enabling us to create "gene libraries." The similarity between writing a computer programme and composing a genetic code is so close that one could well say that geneticists work like programmers.

Contemporary social consciousness is still unable to perceive the significance of such discoveries. When President Ronald Reagan in his address to the nation on April 2, 1988 said that we have no means of knowing what results scientific research will bring, he gave a relatively complete picture of how matters stand as regards the philosophy of science, at least in America.

But suppose we overcome our fear of the stark monster of the scientific and technological revolution and try to outline the positive features that it can offer to man? Then it may be worthwhile even today to begin to create "a gene library" for the present generation of inhabitants of the Earth and house it in the Centre of Man Intelligent and Humane. According to Academician Ivan Frolov, the idea of such a centre enjoys growing popularity.

The main thing is that the temple of Man Intelligent and Humane should serve the cause of uniting the whole of mankind, propagating the new thinking and the belief that life on Earth does not follow rigid laws of astronomic determinism. Man, the intelligent spirit of the Universe, is himself making an active contribution to objective historical processes. Perhaps out there in the infinite far-off spaces of the Universe he sometimes fails to conquer the dangerous frontiers of "high technological development." Armed with the experience of our intellectual brothers, are we the people of the Earth unable to preserve our civilization – perhaps the only one – in the face of the challenges of the nuclear-space age?

A test of principles

Professor Gavriil Popov, D. Sc. (Econ.)

The situation in Nagorny Karabakh is causing considerable tension in our society. I am not going to recall past events here – they merit a special discussion. But one thing is becoming increasingly clear: on that tiny territory perestroika as such is undergoing an acid test. A gap between the masses and the authorities – the most terrible gap for socialism – has formed there.

Perestroika proceeds from ideas of political democracy; in Karabakh, the emphasis is often placed on sheer force. Perestroika proceeds from the idea of reforming the economic mechanism; in Karabakh, the practice of cash injections prevails. Perestroika proceeds from the idea of rousing the masses to vigorous activity and turning them into the motive force of progress; in Karabakh administration by mere injunction is practised to this day.



We know only too well by now, from the bitter experience of our agriculture, for instance, that extra billions will do a system in the throes of crisis no good. And we also know that command methods will, even with the best of intentions, inevitably be counterproductive.

The main point of departure in analyzing the situation in Nagorny Karabakh should be that the national conflict there is simply the external manifestation of the crisis into which the mechanism of deceleration has drawn the country. This is one of the dozens of latent abscesses and tumours we have inherited from the past.

The slower perestroika goes, the harder it is to solve the problems of Karabakh. The first lesson of Karabakh is that it is necessary to speed up the **economic reform.**

Incidentally, the situation in Estonia is almost every bit as complicated, but perestroika is under way there nevertheless, albeit not without difficulty. As I see it, this is due to the fact that all government posts there, at all levels, are held by persons who have the confidence of the people. Consequently, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are in need of radical democratization – which means, specifically, democratic elections. Such elections will filter out the diehards, and government nominees not really fit for their jobs. They will be replaced, at last, by leaders capable of finding a common language with their people. Instead of confining themselves to their offices and sitting on endless meetings (referred to, for some reason, as "voluntary workers' conferences"), they will go out into the streets and rub shoulders with the electorate.

It is feared that irresponsible elements might win at the elections. Lenin teaches us that anarchist outbursts are the price we pay for our opportunist sins. Wherever a truly revolutionary party organization exists, it leaves no room for anarchy. Irresponsible elements thrive on administration by injunction; in conditions of genuine democracy they immediately find themselves in the infinitesimal minority. I have many friends in Armenia and Azerbaijan alike. I am convinced that in either republic there are enough progressive and sober people capable of addressing meetings and conducting inter-nationality negotiations. Therefore, the second lesson of Karabakh is that we must speed up **political perestroika.**

A most terrible gap – a gap between the masses and authorities – has formed in Karabakh

I am a realist, and as such I do not deny, in principle, the need for either enforced measures or cash "injections" in cases where the situation inherited from another epoch can no longer be rectified in the normal way. But it is necessary to bring the need for such methods home to the people.

Another lesson of Karabakh is that we **need more glasnost.** The masses are believed – and rightly so – to fall easy prey to false rumours. But then, rumours are caused by lack of information.

What we need most of all is truth – in the spirit of the 27th CPSU Congress. Let's face it, TASS reports of economic and political developments in the stagnation period were not always very informative. It's high time we knew just how many factories are in and out of action; who addresses the meetings, and what they say. Don't we have authors capable of analyzing current events without pulling their punches, like Yuri Chernichenko and Georgy Radlov? Are our boldest newspapers and magazinens justified in staying aloof from the discussion of Karabakh's problems?

We must get the better of our passiveness and form such public committees as will carry real weight with the peoples of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and we must work for the solution of the Karabakh problem in the spirit of perestroika.

Of course I am fully in favour of every nation being granted the right to self-determination, whether its neighbour likes it or not. The neighbour must bear it in mind that under a certain set of circumstances he might need this right himself. But I am convinced that in the 20th century the right to self-determination is not to be exercised by moving frontier posts from place to place. The answer to the question of how it ought to be exercised will certainly be furnished by our perestroika.

A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on inter-nationality problems has been announced, but it seems to me that we must contemplate a forum such as a congress of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The peoples, mind you, not the republics or regions. Such a congress might revise Brezhnev's constitution and discuss new federal principles for the country consonant with the spirit of perestroika and with our present notion of socialism.

Law on freedom of conscience

When the millenium of the Baptism of Rus was celebrated, it was repeatedly mentioned that a law on freedom of conscience was in the making in this country. What new aspects should the law be able to introduce to relations between State and Church?

Yuri Rosenbaum, LL.D., has kindly granted an interview to a New Times correspondent.

New Times. What progress has been made in the work on the new law on freedom of conscience? What bodies are engaged in the work?

Yuri Rosenbaum. As far as I know, the initial draft of the law has already been prepared. A group of experts from several bodies has been working on it. Among these were the Council for Religious Affairs under the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, the Procurator's Office of the U.S.S.R., Ministry of Justice and Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. I do not know whether any representatives of the general public, any legal scientists in particular, were invited. Late in 1987 the Council for Religious Affairs officially requested the Institute of State and Law of U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, where I work, to prepare a draft of the law. The draft was prepared accordingly and discussed by the Institute, and then forwarded to the Council for Religious Affairs. I do not know what happened to it subsequently.

N.T. Perhaps it would have been more expedient to form a broader working group including legal scientists, representatives of the public and the Church? When the Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church was being worked out under Lenin there was a clergyman on the working commission. Perhaps it would do no harm to publish the draft of the law in the press.



Yuri Rosenbaum, Merited Lawyer of the Russian Federation

Y.R. You mean submit it to a nationwide discussion? I think this is absolutely necessary. A new law, which will affect not only tens of millions of believers, but also the whole of the people, cannot be drawn up in secret. You cannot draft it without knowing the opinions of citizens. A fundamental law, such as the Law on Freedom of Conscience should not be the product of a separate body or bodies. Unfortunately, we have acquired some experience in the preparation of legislative acts by departmental staffs. I hope we have drawn the proper conclusions from this.

N.T. Could you please inform our readers about the development of Soviet legislation on freedom of conscience?

Y.R. As soon as the Great October Socialist Revolution triumphed, the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation, on January 23 (February 5) 1918, adopted a Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church. It is a fact that when the relevant commission submitted the draft Decree to Lenin he introduced several important additions to it and edited it before it appeared in its final form. The Decree served as a model for similar acts which were adopted in the Ukraine in 1919, in Byelorussia in 1922, in Georgia in 1921 and in Armenia in 1922. Several Union Republics, in particular, the Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh and Kirghiz Republics, soon after their formation, made the legislation of the Russian Federation, including the afore-mentioned decree, effective in their respective territories.

Chiefly in the period from 1918 to 1928, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat of Justice issued numerous circulars and instructions, which initially established the regulations and procedures for practical steps to be taken by the local authorities to separate Church from State and Education from the Church, and later dealt with matters bearing on the activities of religious organizations. For instance, the Russian Federation alone issued over 170 acts of this kind. Finally, in April 1929, a general act was published. Known as the Decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation on Religious Associations, it has been effective to this day with a few changes and additions (the most recent ones were adopted in 1975). In 1976-77 all the Union Republics passed similar legislative acts.

N.T. You have only mentioned legislative documents. But, in addition to these, quite a few "secret" acts were issued. These acts introduced considerable changes to the existing legislation...

Y.R. Yes, indeed, the authorities issued a series of classified documents for official use, and certainly not for the press. They established the rights and duties of religious organizations, believers and clergymen. The Instructions on the Application of the Law on Religious Cults of March 16, 1961, is of special interest. Elaborated and approved by the Council for Religious Cults and the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, this departmental legislative act, which had a D notice banning its publication in the press, actually replaced the official legislation on religious cults and was effective for a considerable time.

N.T. You have said that all the Union Republics have open legislative acts governing the status and activities of religious organizations. Why don't they satisfy us today?

Y.R. They did not satisfy us yesterday either. About 20 years ago it was proposed that new legislation on these matters be elaborated. There is no need to speak of the conditions in which the Decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation on Religious Associations was produced in 1929. Its content reflected a familiar thesis of that period to the effect that class struggle became more acute as the construction of socialism progressed.

The activities of religious organizations and clergymen were strictly regulated and the rights of believers were severely restricted. It should also be mentioned that many of the clauses of the Decision adopted in 1929 run counter to Lenin's Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church.

N.T. Did not this act give rise to conflicts between some of the religious groups and state authorities? There were cases when believers refused to observe some of the provisions of the document. As a result, state bodies would have recourse to measures of compulsion. New articles, similar to Article 227 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, appeared in the criminal codes of other Union Republics. Repressive measures produced martyrs for the faith. They are sometimes referred to as "prisoners of conscience." This in turn led to religious fanaticism and extremism. Although Soviet criminal codes have no articles making the profession of religious belief a criminal offence, believers were often brought to trial because their behaviour antagonized the local authorities.



A theological school student

Y.R. Yes, indeed, this outdated and poorly formulated law has been a source of trouble between believers and state bodies. It has given rise to breaches of the law. It is also true that there were cases when criminal proceedings were instituted without any grounds, particularly under Article 227 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and similar articles of the criminal codes of other Union Republics. Such practices have been condemned, and the innocent victims rehabilitated. However, you must agree that serious offences against Soviet laws, including laws bearing on religion, the Church and believers, cannot go unpunished. This is one of the legal guarantees of freedom of conscience in the U.S.S.R. At the same time the degree of responsibility and, in fact, the entire legislation on these matters must be revised.

N.T. You have just said that the question of introducing new legislation was raised a long time ago. Why wasn't it done?

Y.R. Several drafts for a new law were submitted. But all of them were no more than revised and edited versions of the Decision on Religious Associations issued in 1929. The drafts were produced by staff members of the Council for Religious Affairs. They were obviously dominated by ideas about religion typical of the "godless" five-year-plan periods, when it was intended to "do away" with religion within a definite period. During the period of stagnation legislative innovations aroused suspicion. The practice was solely to revise or slightly alter separate clauses of the laws. As I have already pointed out, this was done in 1975-77. Proposals for radical changes were rejected outright. It was even forbidden to set them down in scientific papers. The Council for Religious Affairs kept vigilant watch over this.

N.T. What is your appraisal of the role of the Counci for Religious Affairs at present? Has its position changed?

Y.R. It has, radically. The people who formerly headed the Council were hostile to legal science and ignored it. They obstructed research in freedom of conscience and legislation on religious organizations. In the last 30 years there have been very few serious scientific papers and publications on the subject (you could count them on the fingers of one hand), and the Council is directly responsible for this, because it gave its "blessing" only to papers on atheism and works supporting the status quo. Today many people are speaking frankly about past mistakes in the policy towards religion and the Church, distortions of the Leninist line, and persecution of believers. What was the Council for Religious Affairs doing at the time? If we go through some of the Decisions of the CPSU Central Commitee on atheistic propaganda, we will see that they emphasized the need to observe the laws on religious cults, refrain from administrative measures in combating religion and so on. The wording was correct. But practice, with the participation of the Council, was totally different. Churches were closed down by administrative order, religious associations unlawfully removed from the registers and believers persecuted. To put it in a nutshell, religion was being "abolished." But the duties of the Council are totally different, namely to effect control over the strict observance of the law so that the people are able to exercise their right to freedom of conscience without restriction.

As I see it, the new leadership of the Council for Religious Affairs has adopted a fundamentally new stand. It is trying to reestablish Leninist principles in the policy towards religion, the Church and believers. This is evident from the Council's recent decisions and activities, as well as from interviews with Konstantin Kharchev, chairman of the Council. However, it seems that there are still some quarters that are inhibiting this progressive process.

N.T. At a meeting with the prelates of the Russian Orthodox Church, Mikhail Gorbachev said that "we are fully restoring Leninist principles of policy towards religion, the Church and believers. The attitude to the Church and believers should be determined by the need to strengthen the unity of all working people, the whole of our people." This idea is consonant with Lenin's thesis of the unity of working people in the effort to build paradise on Earth being more important to us than the unity of proletarian opinion about paradise in heaven. Many of the ideas that Mikhail Gorbachev advanced at the meeting give food for thought about the aims of the new Law on Freedom of Conscience. For instance, he said that the Church cannot stand aloof from the processes at work in society, that believers have every right to state their views with dignity, and that perestroika, democracy and glasnost concern them in full degree, without any limitation.

Y.R. Leninist principles in policy towards religion, the Church and believers should, of course, be consolidated in this law. At present they exist independently, as it were, like an abstract theoretical pre-

cept. With the exception of the Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church, these principles are hardly reflected in legislation. Lenin's attitude towards religion, the Church and believers proceeded from the principle of freedom of conscience. However, over a period of many years our legislation on religion and the Church has been officially referred to as the Law on Religious Cults. The term cult, religious cult in particular, connotes a whole range of mystic acts, rites, religious rituals and prayers. Soviet legislation cannot and should not regulate this sphere of the activity of ministers of religion and believers. Though it did not do so in practice, the title of the law to some extent affected the content of the legislation. It stringently regulates in detail many aspects of religious life and has caused the appropriate state bodies to exercise strict control over the activities of believers' associations. Naturally, the new title of the law – the Law on Freedom of Conscience – should effect a radical change in the content of this legislation to bring it into conformity with Leninist principles in policy towards religion, the Church and believers. Article 52 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. guarantees citizens freedom of conscience. It follows that the new law should ensure the full democratic realization of this freedom. It should not concentrate its attention on the detailed reglamentation of procedures for the setting up of religious organizations or the rules governing their activities.

It apears to me that religious associations should now be regarded as a form of public association of citizens with all the legal and social consequences arising herefrom. Of course, they are characterized by specific features which distinguish them from other types of public association. One of these is that religious organizations (the Church) have been separated from the State. They therefore have no right to intervene in its affairs or in matters bearing on public education. This fundamental principle of the Constitution should, naturally, be duly reflected in the new law. As for the State, it should not intervene in the religious (canonical) activities of believers' associations. It should protect their legal rights. In all other respects there are no grounds for limiting their rights or duties. This means that they should be accorded equal treatment with other public associations. Though all religious organizations have been separated from the State, they have not been separated from society, of which they are a part.

All public organizations have the right and duty to pursue their activities within the framework of their rules (statutes) which should be registered by the executive committees of the Soviets of People's Deputies. They all come under Soviet legislation – civil, administrative, financial, labour and criminal. It follows that the State does not need to impose detailed legal regulations on religious organizations, their status or activities. It is important only to introduce for both believers and non-believers a system of legal guarantees of citizens' rights and duties, and to ensure them the right of recourse to the law.

N.T. The participation of believers in public life is for some reason or other being restricted. It is limited mainly to the struggle for peace and disarmament, and against nuclear war. But under the law they cannot practise charity, which is professed by practically all religions. Why?

Y.R. The reason for this ban was that in the past the Church made wide use of the material dependence of many people on it. In those days it had capital which formed part of the national economy. Naturally, many believers remained in the Church because they depended on it, and it was for pecuniary reasons that many new "converts" replenished its flock. But all that was in the past. The issue is now of a totally different kind. For instance, is it possible to forbid the Church to donate more than three million rubles to help the victims of the Chernobyl disaster? Or to contribute 30-odd million rubles a year to the Peace Fund? Society can only welcome and duly appreciate the patriotic activities of the Church. But where does the Church get its funds from? The money comes from the believers, i.e., Soviet citizens who make voluntary donations, guided solely by religious sentiments. The Church donates this money for highly ethical and humane purposes, which are compatible with our cause. The law should encourage such activities, not ban them. ■

PUBLIC OPINION

As Muscovites see it

A new public opinion research centre has been set up under the Soviet Sociological Association. It is working under the general directorship of the Association's President Tatyana Zaslavskaya.

The Centre offers its services in conducting comprehensive and single-theme research on a contract basis. This includes polls of social and professional groups, obtaining prompt information on their requirements, motivation and structure; the organization of "business games" to solve important production and management problems; the preparation and implementation of measures to improve the economic mechanism in connection with the transition of various scientific and production as well as management structures to cost-accounting, the introduction of team forms of organization of labour and lease contracts; the drawing up of schemes for the retraining and redeployment of redundant staff...

The Centre has conducted a number of polls by telephone. Here are some of the results:

January 1988. Attitude towards glasnost. Forty-nine per cent of those polled believe it should be given greater breadth and depth; 34 per cent think there should be limits.

March 1988. Muscovites' attitude to unemployment (in connection with perestroika). Sixty per cent believe "unemployment unacceptable in principle for socialism." Thirty-two per cent think "unemployment under socialism to some extent possible and necessary." That is the view of the young and intellectuals in the humanities. The higher a person's educational level, the more calmly he regards the prospect of unemployment in the country.

May 1988. Attitude to the Soviet press. Ninety per cent believe everything or almost everything they read in the Soviet press. Eight per cent are sceptical, the young most of all. In those over thirty trust in the press is on the increase.

June 1988. Social justice in Soviet society. Forty-three per cent of those polled believe our society is one of social justice; just as many take the opposite view. Most schoolchildren and teenagers believe our society to be socially just. From the age of 20 to 29 "bitter disillusionment" sets in.

August 1988. Muscovites' opinion of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet decision on Nagorny Karabakh. Fourteen per cent believe the question has been fully resolved. Fifty-one per cent that it has been "resolved in principle, but that the problem remains." Sixteen per cent believe it has not been resolved as the rights of the Armenian people have been infringed on. Another one per cent also say no, as the rights of the Azerbaijanian people have been infringed on. Seven per cent don't regard the decision as any sort of solution.

More public opinion surveys and polls are in the offing. The number of customers, both in this country and abroad, is increasing daily.

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The people are not speechless when individuals speak out

The Solyanik affair, or glasnost in stagnation times

"The people are silent" was merely a dramatist's stage direction relating to a group of extras. It was some time later that journalists began to read a "philosophical meaning" into it which, by and large, is not there since it is individuals, rather than whole nations, who speak up – or keep silent, for that matter. So let us, for a start, have second thoughts about the absurd cliche inculcated in us over the decades: "The entire Soviet people unanimously support"... But they cannot unanimously support (or indeed unanimously reject) anything for the reason that if only in each particular case a good half of them, if not the majority, have no idea whatever of what is at issue, of what or who they are to give unanimous support to.

Only individuals can afford the luxury of voicing their support for a cause, be it good or bad (depending on the extent of their moral integrity). Whether they are in the majority or in the minority decides, in the final analysis, the rate of a nation's progress.

Glasnost, the new openness about the past, the present and the future, that we are enjoying today, has not come like a bolt from the blue. As a matter of fact, the skies were not all that blue, and peals of thunder, even though distant and subdued, could be heard even when stagnation was at its worst. There have always been, are, and will be individuals who, no matter how "silent the people are," never resign themselves to spiritual oppression, social injustice, errors of judgement and blunders in the economy or any other sphere of life.

That is why glasnost, the most efficient tool of perestroika, presupposes "solos" rather "choruses." The voice of those who speak for all of us, can still be heard today as a clarion call of perestroika, the only difference being that now there are immeasurably more such voices than in the period when "vox populi" didn't come through.

Now people are encouraged to speak their minds without fear of consequences. But some ventured to do so even at the times when such acts of civil courage could cost them their lives – or their freedom. Nevertheless, they stuck their necks out, raised their voices, trying to make themselves heard and to wake the others up to reality.

Meetings, boastful reports, applause... Welcoming the Sovetskaya Ukraina whaling flotilla home. The newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda afforded a peep behind the scenes in what was one of the first attempts at glasnost in stagnation years.

I am writing this under the impression of a true story about a remarkable attempt at glasnost made in the years of stagnation. The story appeared in Izvestia recently.

To put it in a nutshell, at the time when most publications meted out praise and abuse to orders from above the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda had the courage to lift its hand against someone in the good books of the powers-that-were – A. Solyanik, General Director Captain (with the "General" thrown in for good measure, as was the fashion then) of the Sovetskaya Ukraina whaling flotilla. A product of his time, this "national hero" not only engaged in brazen upward distortions of his flotilla's production indices, but, what's more, created a kingdom of his own where he reigned supreme over two thousand whalemen for years. The reason why he got away with it for so long was that he cleverly lived up to his "tough old salt" image, kicking office doors open and all, and those in high places liked it.

The Izvestia article gives a graphic picture of the storm stirred up by the Komsomolskaya Pravda story, based on whalers' grievances and told by the writer Arkady Sakhnin. The understanding reader discerned in the article, behind an exposé of scandalous practices in the flotilla, a whole phenomenon, that is, the elaborate technique of fooling the public into idolatry.

In the end, justice prevailed and A. Solyanik was dismissed from his post. But only now has the general public learned from the Izvestia article what an effort it had taken to force him into retirement. Stakes in this risky game – the "whale hunt" – were extraordinarily high. Not

only the author of the Komsomolskaya Pravda story, but also the paper's editors, journalists, the flotilla whalers, and many party cadres, who had to do with the Solyanik affair, went through an acid test of steadfastness, adherence to Party principles, and human decency in confrontation with powerful forces.

I testify to this as an eyewitness and as a then Komsomolskaya Pravda reporter who didn't stand idly by. Many of the paper's journalists joined in the clash which was so unusual at the time that the ultimate truth had to be established in heated debates at a CPSU CC Secretariat meeting.

Kim Kostenko, Boris Pankin, Victor Dyunin, Inna Rudenko... and above all Yuri Voronov, then Komsomolskaya Pravda's editor-in-chief, were well aware of what they were up against and what might ensue from their bold challenge. In spite of all this, they did go into action and proved staunch enough to stand the pressure from the all-powerful patrons of the glorious whaler. And they stayed the course, and had their way smiling in the face of adversity. The situation then was such that Komsomolskaya Pravda was not even able to inform its readers of the steps the Secretariat of the CPSU CC had taken as a follow-up of the article, and it is only now that the episode has been made public.

Some wit divided journalists into two categories: those who prefer to hold their tongue, and those eager to give tongue. All the contemporaries live in the same "interesting time" but behave differently. In the old "stagnation" days, most honest people (and not just journalists) sought and found individual ways of "keeping out of it all" and withholding their comments because one had to pay dearly for speaking out. But in spite of all the editorial staff of Komsomolskaya Pravda remained as we quipped an "unsinkable island." (Incidentally, there were other "pockets of resistance" to stagnation – collective farms, factories, drama companies, schools, etc.) A look through newspaper files of those years will confirm this.

At that time Komsomolskaya Pravda came up with many new ideas and approaches which later furnished the basis for the fairly revolutionary economic reform of the sixties (which, however, never materialized). The newspaper was the first to advocate and to put into practice – despite absurd accusations of encroaching on the principles of socialism – the team-contract system in industry (V. Serikov and his team) and the field team responsibility system in agriculture, the forerunner of today's practice of taking farms on lease (V. Pervitsky and other innovative team leaders). It was also the first to declare against artists being pushed about, for which its two staff writers and the editor of the relevant department paid a high price. The paper was the first to organize the elections of a construction team leader – a theretofore unheard-of experiment which it covered on its pages. The newspaper was the first to raise its voice in defence of Lake Baikal, thus initiating a public campaign that went on for years and is only now beginning to bear fruit.

These are just a few of the paper's initiatives. Why did I mention them? To make a point of the fact that some simple souls are still apt to believe in "objective circumstances" which any mean action can be justified by. To this day the antiperestroika elements capitalize on the inertia of certain complaisant intellectuals who are sitting on the fence waiting for others to carry perestroika through. It was none other but the people at large, the silent majority, who brought to power and then put up with those who "were pulling the wrong way." And if somebody suddenly panics in the face of revolutionary perestroika, it is not the abstract "them" but we ourselves. Aren't we inclined at times to simplify things to the point of absurdity, dividing all those around into "us" and "them," identifying "executives" with "bureaucracy," and the press with progress?

Meanwhile, the watershed has always lain elsewhere, and still does. The story of the gunning down of the well-connected whaler is further evidence that upright and dedicated people working for a good cause will always find followers and allies. Neither this author, nor the closely-knit editorial staff of Komsomolskaya Pravda would have stood the pressure from above hadn't they been backed up by the kindred souls – men of principle who, alas, were few and far between in the higher Party echelons. But such men did come to the fore and held out, quite a number of them. Just a few names: V. Shevchenko, secretary of the flotilla's Party organization; Z. Nazarenko, the secretary of the Zhovten district Party executive committee in Odessa, to which the whalers' Party organization was attached; S. Vologzhanin and S. Mogilat, the executives of the Party Control Commission at the CPSU CC; A. Yakovlev, deputy head of the propaganda department at the CPSU Central Committee; and many others. They had won their battle then, each at his party level. As for consequences, both journalists and party executives had more than their share of trouble afterwards.

So everything depends on how firm you stand. If what you stand for is right and in society's interests, it is certain to win through and to find support not only from public opinion but from decision makers, too. This feedback is a guarantee of glasnost and a vital factor of perestroika today.

True, the relationships between some Party and state officials, on the one hand, and the press, on the other, occasionally go awry now that perestroika is marching on. But what kind of officials are in question? Just those who are losing ground all along the line under the pressure of the mass media and the Party itself. It is these officials who are itching to take revenge, to clamp down on the press, and to reduce it to a mere mouthpiece. Oh, how some present-day proponents of the command administrative methods miss the times when the press was at their beck and call!

But there is no turning the clock back. Today the Party itself is different and so is the press, which has regained its militant spirit. They are armed with the concept of perestroika, born in a harsh conflict of forces, positions and tendencies, and firmly believe in its inevitability and irreversibility. Now the voice, the word means action, first and foremost.

The optimism of the Solyanik drama that took place in the middle of the stagnation period lies in that the voices, no mattter how discordant at first, will always reach those who care to listen, later to merge into glasnost, without which our own past, present and future remain largely a mystery to all of us.

Vitaly Ganyushkin

Learning to trade

Two views on a common problem

What are the bottlenecks in economic relations? Are direct ties making progress? Will the partial convertibility of the ruble and forint help?

These and other questions are answered by the Soviet trade representative in Hungary, **Mikhail Kozin,** and the Hungarian deputy trade representative in the U.S.S.R. **Pal Szücs.**

Budapest

For me, as Soviet trade representative, and for my colleagues in the Trade Representation, the present time, strange as it may sound, is a time of learning. It is as if we had to relearn our profession. This is the result of perestroika.

What do we have to learn? Generally speaking, the ability to react quickly to changes; we have to be fully aware of all the ups and downs of the market, and the laws that govern its dynamics. Today the Soviet Union is entering into business partnerships with many foreign firms. That is a new feature, and one that presents difficulties.

As far as Hungary is concerned, this means mastering forms of cooperation that are new to us both on a bilaterial basis and within the framework of the CMEA, as well as improving the traditional forms of trade exchange.

What is the structure of Soviet exports to Hungary at the present stage?

The main component of our exports are fuel and raw materials. They account for over 70 per cent of Soviet exports. For me personally this figure is depressing. From here in Hungary I can see clearly that the time for a change in priorities is due, because it is fuel and raw materials that are subject to the greatest price fluctuations. It seems hardly sensible to build long-term economic relations with Hungary on such shifting sands.

Yet, according to expert estimates, in this five-year-plan period the mutual volume of trade should come to 50,000 million rubles, a 25 per cent increase on the previous five-year-plan period. But let's take a closer look at these figures. While our purchases in Hungary have increased through greater imports of goods, the value of exports was largely ensured by higher prices for fuel and raw materials, while their volume remained the same.

So this is just an illusion of trade expansion?

Let us put it less emotionally – it is an imbalance in economic relations. It first emerged as a result of the increase in world prices for fuel and raw materials in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. That gave the Soviet Union a surplus in its trade with Hungary. This discrepancy was removed by additional purchases of traditional Hungarian export goods.

From the mid–1980s on the situation changed radically. Fuel and raw material prices plummeted. This resulted in the value of Soviet exports dropping last year for the first time in the history of our economic ties. Today we are jointly working on the far from simple problem of finding ways and means of balancing our trade turnover.

And has this search already produced results?

The main way out is obvious: we have to increase Soviet exports of machines and equipment. That is the group of commodities (if they are of high quality) that interest our Hungarian friends. Recently sales to Hungary of cars and lorries have increased, and this year we are expecting the delivery of new models of excavators, tractors and harvesting combines from the Soviet Union. Exports from the engineering industry are expected to increase this year by 17 per cent. But I would refrain from optimistic assessments.

Why?

For one thing, Hungary could buy more cars, diesel lorries and up-to-date models of tractors, for instance, but we are unable to offer the required quantities. Secondly, I would like to say something that I may have refrained from mentioning in the past because of a false notion of diplomacy: we are waiting for a more active stand to be taken by our Hungarian partners. It is common practice in international trade for a country's representatives to seek out for themselves what they need in their partner's country. Such an approach would naturally require changes from our side. For the information now being delivered by our foreign trade organizations and enterprises about their export possibilities is very inadequate. I think greater pressure from those interested in buying (and that naturally does not just apply to Hungary) could help change the situation. I hope my words will be received as a business proposition, not as a reproach...

But doesn't that mean that Soviet foreign trade services are trying to shift some of their own duties to the Hungarian side?

By no means. What I have in mind is greater mutual trust between partners.

An additional reserve for expanding our exports today could be the consumer goods produced by engineering plants in this country that have received the right to conduct foreign trade on their own. What goods? Refrigerators, TV sets, washing machines. The best models we produce are in constant demand in Hungary.

Today Soviet businessmen come to Hungary – representatives of factories, associations, and firms from many republics. But so far they have been rather chaotic trips. Many of them have themselves no clear idea of what they've come for. To look around, pick out what might interest them and establish the first ties? But doesn't that work out a bit too expensive? For many of those who come leave empty-handed – they are not authorized to arrange deals, and often don't know how to go about it. It's hurtful when Soviet businessmen going abroad reveal themselves to be naive novices. One has to prepare for partnership well in advance, not in the course of an expensive trip.

Are Soviet imports from Hungary being rationalized?

Yes, and the main sign of this is the development of new forms of economic cooperation.

What forms do you have in mind?

Back in November 1986, agreements were concluded at government level on the establishment and main principles for the functioning of Soviet-Hungarian economic organizations, and direct production, scientific and technical ties between associations, enterprises and organizations of the two countries. There are already more than 150 agreements on such ties. And within their framework the additional volume of trade has reached 15 million rubles.

The most promising thing in this context is joint enterprises. Twelve have been formed, including those for the production and sale of medical and electronic equipment.

Are there any difficulties in setting up and strengthening direct ties?

The procedure for organizing joint enterprises is still complicated, many bureaucratic obstacles still have to be eliminated, and too many papers and signatures are required. Another obstacle, in my opinion, is that not everything has been fully worked out where forming the basic capital of a joint enterprise is concerned. There are different views on the size of each partner's contribution and its form – transferable rubles, currency, equipment, technology, etc.

Of course these are difficulties that could probably be ironed out at government level – for example, by introducing partial convertibility of the ruble and forint to service joint enterprises and direct business ties in general. Such convertibility would make it possible to make wider use of the money earned in national currencies for the purchase of the necessary goods on both markets.

There is another difficulty – the initiative for joint enterprises often comes not from the enterprises themselves, but from the higher echelons of power. I believe that such things cannot be imposed. Finally, there are differences in the legal basis of Soviet and Hungarian enterprises.

But I am convinced that all these are passing difficulties, and can be overcome.

Moscow

First a few general remarks. The Soviet Union is our biggest foreign trade partner. The value of our trade in commodities already comes close to 10,000 million rubles a year. About a third of Hungary's foreign trade is with the Soviet Union. Nearly half our engineering and 40 per cent of our agricultural exports go to the Soviet Union.

You've spoken of traditional forms of cooperation...

These traditional forms have played and continue to play an important role in our economic relations. A typical example of their usefulness are the Ikarus buses on your streets and the Ladas on Hungary's roads.

But we do not shut our eyes to the shortcomings of traditional forms. The chief of these are the existence of far too many intermediaries between the producer and the consumer, inertia, and a lack of the flexibility whereby innovations could be picked up rapidly and new requirements taken into account.

Perestroika in the U.S.S.R. and the great changes in the economic life of our country have recently given the green light to more progressive forms of socialist cooperation and division of labour: direct ties and joint ventures. Such ties exist, for example, between a Hungarian shoe factory and the Soviet footwear association Zarya, the firms Budaprint, Hungarotex and Estonian enterprises, a viscose plant in Hungary and the Saratov chemical plant.

A somewhat different agreement was concluded between the Hungarian factory Ganz, which produces current-measuring instruments, and the Lithuanian firm Sigma. They produce the same types of goods, and have agreed to act jointly on the markets of third countries.

And what view do you take on joint ventures?

In this field things are moving more slowly. It's a new field and we lack experience. If we want such enterprises to work well and be highly profitable, setting them up requires preliminary economic calculations. The partners have to invest considerable money in a joint venture. Today, twelve such agreements have been reached. Some enterprises are already working: Micromed, and Intermos in Hungary, Volanpack-Littara in Lithuania, Tisza in Moscow and others.

What are they like and what do they do?

Micromed was set up in the Hungarian town of Esztergom on the basis of an agreement between the well-known Hungarian producer of medical equipment Medicor and the U.S.S.R. Medical Engineering Research Institute. It produces modern diagnostic equipment. The Soviet Union is its principal consumer. Intermos in Budapest produces large-scale integrated circuits. They too are dispatched chiefly to the Soviet Union, although the factory also takes Hungarian orders. Volanpack-Littara was set up as a result of an agreement reached between the Hungarian packaging firm Volanpack and the Lithuanian Littara. Using Hungarian technology, the factory produces special transport packaging material for export goods sent by Soviet enterprises to different countries of the world. Tisza is a joint advertising agency. Its job is to advertise Soviet export potential abroad and bring offers of foreign firms to the notice of Soviet organizations.

In other words, all the joint ventures that exist today are in the main satisfying Soviet requirements. Isn't Hungary interested in their output and services?

The point is that our domestic requirements in export packaging and advertising are effectively being fully met by Hungarian firms, while our requirements in the medical equipment made by Micromed and in integrated circuits are much smaller than those of the Soviet Union.

So there is a certain imbalance. Does it suit you?

In this five-year-plan period, as a result of changes in the prices of the goods we sell each other, a certain trend has emerged towards the formation of a surplus in Hungary's favour. Exports from Hungary connected with the operations of joint enterprises were not taken into account in the five-year agreements, and so this too tends to increase our surplus, which is not to the advantage of the Hungarian side.

I don't quite understand. It would seem that the Hungarian participants in joint ventures could use the convertible rubles they earn to buy the equipment, raw materials and machines they need from the Soviet Union...

It only seems that way. In reality, however, the main volume of mutual deliveries is determined in long-term agreements. Any additional quantities or types of goods for which there is a demand in Hungary are not as a rule sold freely on the Soviet market. And Soviet organizations want to sell goods produced over and above the plan in return for something they need.

What way out do you see?

We hope to improve the situation somewhat by setting up joint ventures as a result of which additional goods would be produced for export to Hungary from the Soviet Union. Specifically, I could mention the production organization Sovventextil in Moscow which would produce nonwoven textile goods for industry and land improvement. Such pro-



A Micromed shop

MTI–TASS photo

ducts would find a demand both in Hungary and on the markets of third countries.

Talks have also begun on a joint enterprise in the Ukraine for processing metal slag on the basis of a special technology. In this case our side is interested in receiving the iron-containing raw materials extracted from the slag, while the Soviet side needs the refined slag for construction. We should like to see more of similar undertakings.

All that would to some extent help to remove the overall imbalance in trade. But an imbalance would remain between the specific partners in the joint venture, wouldn't it?

Yes, and this problem can only be resolved by including the output of joint enterprises in the annual trade protocols. That has been done this year. But Soviet enterprises could find themselves in a similar situation should they want to spend their earned transferable rubles in Hungary on machines, instruments, equipment. So the problem is not confined to settling accounts between participants in joint enterprises.

Some CMEA countries have agreed between themselves on mutual payments in the national currency for accounts between firms setting up direct ties...

In our circumstances that would create two problems instead of one. If it is hard to ensure a balance in transferable rubles, how can one be achieved in national currencies? It would be necessary for each side to be able to spend the currency it earned – in the U.S.S.R. rubles, in Hungary forints – on any purchases, including raw materials, consumer goods, etc., in keeping with its requirements.

So what should be done?

We believe that the main problem – and not just for us, but for CMEA in general – is that the transferable ruble operates only as a unit figuring in accounts. The side that has earned a surplus finds itself a creditor. And it is far from easy to return the credit as payment for the goods it requires. The best way out would be to make the transferable ruble convertible. The necessity for doing so has been appreciated, but not all member countries are as yet ready for such a step. So for a start there would probably be some sense in establishing the following rule: the surplus formed in mutual accounts should be liquidated through deliveries of goods during agreed periods and on agreed mutually advantageous terms. If in this period the surplus has not been paid off, then the debt should be repaid on terms advantageous to the creditor. For instance, in convertible currency. That would be an incentive to all sides to increase exports.

Incidentally, it would also solve other problems, as, for example, the problem of how participants in joint ventures can use the profits from their invested capital. At the beginning, of course, the profits would be ploughed back into production. But there would come a time when the partners would want to see their invested capital returned with interest. This would also facilitate the self-formation of joint capital and help resolve social problems.

What do you mean by social problems?

Way of life and working conditions. We proceed from the fact that at a joint enterprise there must be an international administration, an international collective of experts, not just people sent on a short trip, but working at the enterpise and earning their money there.

Joint ventures and their management are naturally interested in the best specialists. In practice, however, you would be hard put to find a specialist in Hungary prepared to work for the wages current in the Soviet Union. It is no less difficult to find a good Soviet specialist to work at a joint enterprise in Hungary. The wages might be higher but, after all, the cost of living is higher too, so the benefits will seem much less attractive. And then moving house and changing your place of work, even though temporarily, is not easy.

So unresolved issues exist in the organizational, financial, the legal and social aspects of the problem. We believe that they are not insoluble. They can and must be resolved. Today we often have to take decisions applying solely to a specific case. The development of commodity-monetary relations in the economic cooperation between the CMEA countries and the experience of joint ventures confirm that it is necessary to draw up a set of universal rules that would promote new trends in cooperation.

Interviewers:

in Moscow **– Alexander DIDUSENKO**

in Budapest **– Yuri SHEVCHENKO**

■

The Blas Roca Contingent

What the Cubans are calling "the process of correcting mistakes and overcoming negative tendencies" is now under way on Freedom Island

"We no longer have the problems that existed 25 years ago," Fidel Castro said in a speech commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs. "But then we have people who are lazy, sloppy, irresponsible... People who want privilege and a fast buck – not earned, but made through swindling, profiteering, illicit trading."

This speech initiated the process of correcting mistakes and overcoming negative tendencies that Cubans refer to, for short, as "rectificación."

The Cuban leader cited examples. A certain state-run enterprise charged a state-owned hospital 5,000 pesos for doing a job worth about 300 pesos. In a free peasant market, certain individuals made big money selling garlic at a peso a clove.

Peasant markets, which provided an outlet for about 2 per cent of farm produce, have been closed down on the grounds that, in the Cuban comrades' opinion, they are a serious obstacle to the development of the cooperative movement. Numerous other measures aimed at making the country's economy and social and moral climate healthier have been elaborated.

An experiment

The State Committee for Labour and Social Security has assigned 243 enterprises to putting innovations, separately or as a package, through practical trials. The experiment in advanced work organization now being conducted by the East-West Motorway collective in Havana merits special mention.

This collective is known as the Blas Roca Contingent. Professional builders constitute only 15 per cent of the work force, with the rest learning on the job. Among those engaged in constructing one of the viaducts, one can see former officials at the Foreign Trade Ministry, who have joined the contingent of college–educated young men of their own free will.

Candido Hernandez, leader of the contingent, told me about the rules with which all his subordinates are supposed to comply.

The workers have to put in 14 hours a day – or more if they fail to fulfil the daily assignment for any reason, objective or subjective. Incidentally, the "work better and more" principle, proclaimed in the process of "rectificación" has been adopted by many other enterprises engaged in the experiment. No meetings or activities unrelated to the work in hand are allowed.

On-the-job drinking is absolutely out – if caught drunk during a working day, the offender is expelled from the contingent. Being late for work, or playing truant, carries a disciplinary punishment. Even if the excuse for being late is valid, the guilty party has to justify this breach of discipline before the entire team and, later, the entire collective at a monthly production conference. Commendations are of a moral nature in most cases. Work is paid by the hour; the pay depends on the worker's speciality, skill, whether or not he fulfils his production quota, and the quality of his performance. No bonuses are awarded. By way of incentive, a front-ranking worker is publicly honoured in his neighbourhood, and his relatives are invited to visit the construction site.

Commenting on this system of payment and incentives, the Cuban journalist Eloy Concepcion pointed out that it crushed the very foundation of what he described as the false concept according to which the worker is a sort of component motivated solely by money. "Seeking to achieve economic efficiency," Fidel Castro said, "we have created a nutrient medium for a host of vices and distortions and, worse, for corruption!" The Cuban leaders pointed out that a worker who was paid five times his due thanks to inadequate quotas and poor bookkeeping and his irresponsible chiefs' generosity with bonuses, was threatened as much with moral degradation as his superiors who used state property entrusted to them in their personal interests.

The Blas Roca Contingent set itself the task of proving that a sense of duty and conscience are a sufficient guarantee of good work. While promoting this movement, Cubans insistently stress, however, that lest the idea be distorted it should not be enforced where the conditions for it are not yet ripe.

Conscientious attitudes to work are consolidated in the contingent by explaining to each worker, in detail, his daily assignment and work schedule (which is rather tight). Full use of equipment and mastery of more than one skill are obligatory.

Another rule is that everyone should be fully aware of the cost of each product in terms of materials and fuel consumption. Cost accounting and control over it are, perhaps, the most talked-of aspects of the innovations that have been introduced at the East-West Motorway construction site.

Control over finances and the press

"Previously I had no idea of what cost accounting was," Candido Hernandez told me. It had not in fact previously been taken account of in Cuba. At the end of each year, factories' debts to the banks were written off at the expense of the budget, and factory directors could pay as much as they pleased for any job. The decline of financial control set in at the end of the sixties, in what the trade union paper Trabajadores described as "a period of idealism in economic management." Production quotas were cancelled, fixed wages introduced, and accountants dismissed.

In the course of "rectificación," commissions of experts started auditing financial balance sheets on a mass scale, which often caused nervous reactions in the reopened accountancy offices. The question of the accountant's ethics was raised because even in Havana three quarters of accounting reports have been pronounced unreliable, if not downright fraudulent (one recent auditing set the percentage of such reports at 36).

Despite a shortage of machinery, construction work is going full blast in Havana.
Photo by author

In their all-out effort to step up control, exactingness and responsibility, the Cubans assign a special role to the press, which is now also going through a "rectificación" process of its own. "Our press has been too easy on everyone," Carlos Aldana, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, stated with regret in his address to newsmen. "We shall make further headway when it becomes less easy on everyone and less susceptible to pressure." Our Cuban colleagues write of the need to ease self-censorship and counter the influence of leaders who do not realize the beneficial and wholesome effect of press criticism. Although criticism has not yet become a permanent function of the press here, critiques now appear in its pages much more frequently than before.

Readers are of help to the press in selecting targets for criticism. Here are a couple of excerpts from readers' letters published by the newspaper Granma, the organ of the Communist Party's Central Committee: "It is necessary that all our government structures undergo extensive and profound democratization, that each chief should be in duty bound to report to the collective for which he is responsible..." "I think that in our society the working people are alienated from the means of production due to the misinterpretation of the law of distribution under socialism, and the fact that we have still to attain a full measure of socialist democracy."

A kiss in triplicate

Outwardly unpretentious, inside the hostels of the Blas Roca Contingent are clean and cosy. They offer the workingman every comfort he needs after long hours in the tropical sun: sprung mattresses, showers with hot and cold water on tap, and air conditioners. Good hostels and canteens are among the obligatory conditions of the experiment, which presupposes attention to people's needs.

In fact, the contingent was formed out of consideration for those threatened with redundancy as a result of personnel cuts, especially in offices. The anti-red-tape campaign, another important aspect of "rectificación," aims at a sharp (up to 50 per cent) reduction in managerial staff. "Give a man a post, and he will spawn 25 papers right away," an administrator quipped sadly. The bureaucrat, a standing Cuban joke goes, demands that even his wife should give him every kiss in triplicate.

The Working Personnel Policy Group was formed in August 1986, under the chairmanship of Senen Casas Regueiro. In his opinion, many Cuban executives do not possess a standard of education high enough to qualify them for their posts. One cannot be an executive forever. No post should be for life. There must always be a reserve of skilled workers in line for promotion.

It is an established rule in Cuba that length of service is the main qualification for promotion. While helping to keep personnel fluctuation down, this restricts the prospects for capable young people and detracts from their incentives to improve their professional skills. Therefore the rule has been dropped at experimental enterprises, the Blas Roca Contingent included. Problems of employment are dealt with there by a special commission comprising representatives of the management, the work collective and public organizations.

By way of experiment, the contingent has been allowed to have an administrative staff constituting no more than 10 per cent of the total work force employed. In other building organizations the proportion of managerial personnel amounts to 30 per cent, and at the Mella plant to 50 per cent of the total (as of the beginning of the experiment). Cutbacks on professional executive staffs will be accompanied by the involvement of the entire collective in handling managerial problems, specifically in discussing plans at production conferences.

As we see, "rectificación" involves the adjustment of production plans as well. New indicators – such as prices, supplies under coproduction contracts, etc – are being introduced. At the same time, the number of plan targets set by central authorities for enterprises is being reduced from 25-30 to 18, on average.

Planning and the market

Simultaneously centralized planning is coming to play an increasingly important role in rectifying past mistakes, the Cubans say. Among the negative tendencies of the past few years, mention is made of industrial enterprises having shown a marked preference for selling rather than supplying goods; as a result, they produced what brought them profit, and failed to take proper account of the interests of their customers, industry and the public. "Resisting subordination to the market is a permanent feature of our concept of cost accounting," Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party's Central Committee, told the Ministry of Basic Industries officials in a summer 1987 address. "The plan of an enterprise, its capital investments and even its range of output have to be determined by the centre, on the whole. If we allow an enterprise to produce what is most profitable to it economically, we shall commit serious and grave mistakes."

As they draw up the "rectificación" strategy, the Cuban comrades are paying special attention to the specific conditions that obtain in their country. "We must proceed along our own course," Fidel Castro told a building workers' congress. "We are not obliged to copy anyone's practice, and we cannot afford strategic mistakes because we are on the very threshold of imperialism..." Later Fidel Castro pointed out in one of his speeches that anything that smacked of capitalism did not suit Cuba.

The enthusiasm of the workers of the Blas Roca Contingent is bringing concrete results. The Cubans think that "rectificación" creates more problems than it solves. But any visitor to Havana can see how fast the construction of the new metropolitan avenue is progressing..

Vitaly Sobolev,
our own correspondent
HAVANA

Lieutenant Colonel Eichelberger testifies

A 55-year-old American intelligence report declassified

Seventy years ago, in the autumn of 1918, U.S. transports with American troops on board entered Vladivostok Bay. This was the beginning of the intervention in the Soviet Far East of the U.S. Expeditionary Forces. But first, the background story.

Below **Victor MALKOV,** D. Sc. (Hist.), a prominent authority on Soviet-American relations, discusses the subject in an interview to New Times.

How is that intervention evaluated by U.S. historiographers?

A good many serious studies have been made of the U.S. intervention against Soviet Russia. The 1950s, for example, saw the publication of the works by the well-known American historian William A. Williams which reconstructed step by step the true picture of the intervention all the way to 1922, when the last American soldier left our country. Williams gave an authentic appraisal of the hostile policy of the Woodrow Wilson administration towards the young Soviet state.

But the writings of Williams and other like-minded researchers are unknown to the general public in America. The page in the annals of U.S. foreign policy written with the bayonets of intervention has been relegated to oblivion. Were that not the case, the prestigious television network ABC would hardly venture to produce the notorious TV serial "Amerika." Unlike the cinematographic invasion of America by Soviet troops, the American intervention in Russia really happened. Yet no mention of it is to be found in any American history books or in popular writings intended for the general public.

As for the experts, let me give you one example. I attended the third conference of representatives of the Soviet and American public in Chautauqua. My opponent in the debate was Dr Gregory Guroff, a prominent figure in the U.S. Information Agency. In his paper among other things he did mention the intervention. But the gist of what he said was this: yes, there was an intervention. But it played no part in Soviet-American relations and in general its purpose is inexplicable.

This thesis is the keynote of the writings of leading American historians. Another point constantly emphasized is that the U.S. intervention was, allegedly, not interference in Russian affairs; the troops were there for the sole purpose of protecting, firstly, American stores of munitions located on Russian territory, and secondly, the Trans-Siberian railway. This has been the traditional view of American historiography since the well-known historian and diplomat George Kennan advanced the contention that archive documents contained no evidence of any other motives.

Do the archive documents confirm this contention?

On the contrary. Documents found by historians show that there was nothing "accidental" about the intervention. Intervention in Russia was seriously considered by the American government as far back as December 1917. All the pros and cons were carefully weighed and the purpose of the intrusion was clearly defined.

Of course, from the very outset there was no unanimity in U.S. ruling circles as regards policy towards Russia. There was a small but influential group of politicians who were opposed to U.S. interference in the civil war in Russia. For various reasons, President Wilson, his closest adviser House and Secretary of War Baker hesitated (at least at the initial stage) to take any action. The chief opponent of "doing nothing" was Secretary of State Lansing who, in a letter to the President dated December 10, 1917 strongly urged U.S. support for the counterrevolution in Russia.

It is noteworthy that the final decision on joint intervention with Japan was taken at a secret meeting in the White House on July 6, 1918, the very day on which Mirbach, the German Ambassador in Moscow, was assassinated and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries staged an uprising. This may be a mere coincidence. But why, one might ask, was the decision to intervene not made public on July 7 or 8? Was it not perhaps because it was expected that the whole problem would resolve itself at any moment – the Soviet government would be overthrown, in which case there would be no need for any action at all. It was only on August 3, 1918 that the American people learned of the decision from a government statement for the press when it became clear that such expectations were groundless. Of course, this is only a hypothesis, but the timing of the events of July 6, 1918 in Moscow and in Washington is suggestive.

What was the pretext for interference in the internal affairs of our country? After all, the U.S. Congress had not declared war on Soviet Russia, the Wilson administration had not broken off diplomatic relations with our country and Washington had received no request for military aid from Russia.

True, all this did compel the State Department to rack its brains for some way of disguising the real reasons for the intervention. And, of course, a pretext was found: assistance to the nearly 70,000-strong Czechoslovak corps (former prisoners of war) which was making its way over the Trans-Siberian railway to Vladivostok. Yet no one was attacking the well-armed White Czechs, besides which they themselves preferred to push not eastward, to the sea, but to the West.

How did events develop?

The first contingent of American troops landed in Vladivostok on August 16, 1918. The main force, commanded by Major General Graves, arrived on board the transport Thomas on September 1, 1918. However, the commander of the Expeditionary Forces soon discovered that the operation would not be a walk-over, that the otpimistic hopes of "swiftly uprooting Bolshevism" were unfounded and that a difficult time was in store for the army of intervention in Siberia. Encountering the growing resistance of the Siberian population to the invaders and the white-guard cliques, Graves and many of his staff officers realized that their mission would not only reap no laurels but would make the American troops accomplices in the bloody orgy staged by the "pacifiers" of the type of Ataman Semyonov and Kalmykov whom the commander of the Expeditionary Forces himself later described as downright scoundrels and murderers. Graves and some of his staff officers came to the conclusion that the thing to do was to get out.

Did Washington agree with them?

Washington thought differently. Many there harboured the illusion that the combined forces of the counterrevolution would win, they still pinned their hopes on Kolchak. For at first, as the documents show, the American government did not rule out the escalation of the American military presence as the counter-revolutionaries brought more of Eastern and Western Siberia under their control and pressed on toward the central areas of Russia. They placed their main stakes on the "Omsk ruler" and on the mutiuny of the pro-Kolchak Czechoslovak legionnaires which broke out in the spring of 1918. Incidentally, the present Washington administration also considers that it has the right to engage in subversion against other countries if this accords with the interests of the U.S.A.

You frequently cite documents from American archives where, I understand, you have had occasion to work in the course of your researches. It is said that in the United States secret documents are declassified after 20 to 30 years and made available for researchers. Is that correct?

By no means always. For instance, in connection with the subject we are discussing I can show you a document I found in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace which was declassified only after a lapse of 55 years – in 1974. It was written on November 7, 1919 by the American Intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel R.L. Eichelberger, deputy chief of staff of the Expeditionary corps. Eichelberger was a well-trained professional with an analytical mind. He was a graduate of a military academy and the General Staff school in the U.S.A. Incidentally, he was later to rise to a position of considerable prominence in the U.S. Army. In 1942 he was commander of the 77th Infantry Division, in 1942-44, commander of the 1st Army Corps, and in 1944 he was in command of the Eighth Army in the Pacific. He retired in 1948 with the rank of Lieutenant General, and later served as an adviser to the Defence Department.

The Eichelberger document appeared at a critical time. The Russian monarchists and their patrons in the diplomatic service of the United States in Siberia and the Far East, as well as the Washington "hawks" pinned their last hope of success on inducing the United States to recognize Kolchak and obtaining extra financial and military assistance. But what was the actual state of affairs? Washington had to take a decision. Lieutenant Colonel Eichelberger who, on orders from above, moved constantly in Kolchak circles, where he was considered "one of themselves," realized well how difficult his mission was.

Being an honest professional, this American intelligence officer wrote a report that could be compared to the findings of a medical expert, matter-of-fact and uncompromising. Eichelberger finished writing his report one week before the fall of Omsk and the entry of the Red Army into the city. His predictions proved accurate: demoralized by the Red Army's hammer blows in which the hatred of the population seemed to be concentrated, the Kolchak army literally disintegrated. On January 9, 1920 the U.S. government officially announced that the American forces would be withdrawn within the next few months. The last unit of the invaders left Russian soil in November 1922.

And now, the document I quote:

Classified

November 7, 1919

From Intelligence Officer To Director, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C.

The Kolchak Government.

1. The commanding general has authorized that this letter be sent direct without reference either to him or to the chief of staff. I, therefore, wish to take full responsibility for the opinions and statements made herein.

2. The support that has been given the Kolchak government on the part, at least of the United States, has been given, I believe, because of an honest desire to support a government which might be used successfully in combating Bolshevism. It is my belief that no such vehicle as the Kolchak government can ever succesfully combat Bolshevism.

3. The world has received reports that the Kolchak government is made up of a band of patriots defending the world against the advance of Bolshevism. It must have then seemed strange to many, that the Omsk government, backed

American troops in Siberia

strongly by England and to a lesser extent by the other Allies, with access to the outside world and in possession of a large gold reserve, has not been able to withstand the advances of the Red Army.

4. Many of the pleas for the support of the Omsk government have been based upon the personality of Admiral Kolchak himself, the strongest factor, ignoring the weak features, such as the Cossack atamans: Dutoff, Ivanoff-Rinoff, Semenoff and Kalmikoff, and the fact that the great majority of the officers and politicians connected with the Omsk government are of monarchistic and reactionary principles. It must be remembered that it is in the name of the Kolchak government that Ataman Kalmikoff and Ataman Semenoff have murdered, tortured and robbed in Eastern Siberia, and that it was in the name of the Kolchak government that such men as Rozanoff and Annenkoff have murdered in Western Siberia. There are some sincere men connected with the Omsk government and a few who would be willing to treat the people according to our American ideals, but these men are in a hopeless minority.

5. The greatest weakness of the Omsk government lies in the fact that the great majority of the population are opposed to it. Roughly speaking, probably 97 per cent of the people of Siberia today are anti-Kolchak.

6. The attitude taken by the reactionary group during the days of the All-Siberian government and later, under the so-called Omsk government was as follows: all opposed were collectively termed Bolsheviki. Going a step further, they would refer to the atrocities committed by the Bolsheviki in Russia and would state then that all Bolsheviki should be killed.

7. The Russian peasant, after a year of the Kolchak government, can only point to his son forcibly mobilized into the Kolchak army; his villages burned; his goods stolen; and little or no market for his farm products. He has seen train-loads of refugees and sick or wounded soldiers returning from the front, shunted from town to town with little or no attention and little sympathy.

8. Just, as in the past, the tsar's government treated the masses so that the world was finally presented with Bolshevism with all its horrors and irrational theories, just so now, the Kolchak government is increasing Bolshevism and is making the masses more and more bitter towards the Omsk government and the Allied governments supporting it. A year ago in Siberia, Bolshevism was on the wane, the Russians were tired of fighting, and if a group of decent men had arisen which would have given the people a firm but just government, Bolshevism would have died a natural death in Siberia. Today, I believe there are ten Bolsheviki in Siberia, to one a year ago.

General Knox, the head of the British Mission, General Graves, commander of the Expeditionary Forces, and Caldwell, the U.S. Consul.

9. Many of the reports which have reached the world concerning the merits of the Kolchak government, have emanated from the British Government and these reports have, in most cases, originated with General Knox. I have seen some of General Knox's reports and have received reliable information of the contents of other reports.

10. It must puzzle many people that the official British reports and reports from American sources vary in many respects. The true facts I believe to be as follows:

a) General Knox was almost directly responsible for the coup d'etat that put Admiral Kolchak in power. The Kolchak government is referred to by many in Siberia as the "Knox government."

b) We have seen such men as Mr O'Reilly, Acting British High Commissioner, and Colonel Sir Edward Grogan, at one time head of the local British Mission, relieved from duty and ordered to leave Siberia without delay, because of opposition to General Knox's views.

c) It is only after many conversations with British officers coming from the front that one realizes that General Knox's views are not shared by the average British officer and that they realize that the Omsk government is not the type of government that the Knox reports have advertised to the British public.

For example; Colonel Wickham, the present head of the British Mission in Vladivostok, in speaking of British support of Kolchak, said: "I realize that this is a rotten show that we are conducting. The British Government hopes to use the Kolchak government in downing Bolshevism but it is a mighty weak vehicle upon which to place support."

d) General Knox is a monarchist and his feelings are typified in an expression that he used in the presence of the Commanding General, A.E.F., Siberia: "The people are swine."

11. It is true that the Kolchak government has, at times, promulgated democratic proclamations and has shown some small evidences of democratic tendencies. When the Kolchak government has seemed to be gaining strength, one hears that "It will be impossible to have a Constituent Assembly until after a strong government has been established; during a crisis, rumors that a Constitutent Assembly will shortly be established are spread broadcast. The average democratic Russian puts no credence in the democratic utterances of the Omsk government.

12. The Omsk government is made up of many different groups or cliques. There are the officers of Japanese orientation; the pro-German officers; pro-English officers, the Cossack group; the monarchistic group, etc. Some officers of

course could properly be included in several of the above mentioned groups.

13. The German group is rapidly growing – both in Vladivostok and in Omsk, secret monarchistic meetings are held in which alliance with Germany is discussed. There is a group of German officers now living in Vladivostok; these officers and the monarchistic group hold frequent meetings here. General Rozanoff, the Governor of the Maritime Provinces, is one of the latter group. Reports indicate that the Japanese have representatives at these meetings.

14. The conflicting interests of these different cliques has been one of the greatest weaknesses of the Omsk government. The case of General Rozanoff has been an interestng example of the weakness of the Omsk government:

a) General Rozanoff was well known before his appointment here as being a man of monarchistic principles and a murderer. His chief claim to distinction lay in the fact that he pacified the Krasnoyarsk District. He pacified that district in the same way that we could liquidate a strike in a coal district in America; by using Federal troops to shoot the strikers and burn the villages.

b) Rozanoff on arrival at Vladivostok at once allied himself with the Japanese; used terroristic methods and deliberately antagonized some of the Allies, particularly America. Following the Iman incident, in which an American soldier was flogged by Cossack officers, the commanding general sent Rozanoff a letter requesting investigation and apology. Notwithstanding that an apology was rendered at Washington by the Russian representative and one later rendered by the Foreign Minister at Omsk, General Rozanoff has not even had the courtesy to answer the commanding general's letter.

c) When the Iman incident occurred, the entire incident was presented by Major Slaughter at Omsk to Minister Sukine. No notice of this matter was taken by Minister Sukine, and yet when our State Department made representations to him and he realized that the Kolchak government might lose support from America he promptly denounced the Iman incident as an outrage, rendered an apology and said that he had never before heard of this incident.

15. I realize that many reports from American sources have also been very favourable to the Omsk government. I will state frankly my opinion concerning how some Americans get a very optimistic opinion of the Omsk government. The Russians with whom we have social and official relations are, of course, numbered among the small



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Intelligence Officer.

Director, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D. C.

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The classified report by Lieutenant Colonel Eichelberger

percentage who support the Omsk government. Some of our representatives have spent many years in Russia, and their friends come entirely from the intelligentsia class. The conversation at Russian dinners and social gatherings (I have attended many) dwell often on the atrocities of the Bolsheviki and the merits of the Omsk government. Our representatives have frequently been shown the bodies of Russians murdered by the Bolsheviki. After frequent conversations with Russians of the intelligentsia class it is very easy for one to change from an unfriendly feeling held towards the Bolsheviki, to one of friendship for those opposed to Bolshevism, especially, as the Russians are an hospitable people and very pleasant socially.

16. If an American representative be satisfied to gain his information from the official reports of the Russian Staff (Kolchak's – **V.M.)** and from the statements of his friends among the Russian officials, he can soon sincerely feel that the Omsk government must be supported because it is anti-Bolsheviki.

17. One of the complaints made by Russian officials against the Commanding General, A.E.F., Siberia, is that he has refused to depend solely upon reports of the Russian Staff for his information, but has studied the situation from all angles. When history later gives the true facts concerning the Siberian situation, I believe it will be established that there have been as many Russians executed by the Omsk officials at Omsk and Ekaterinburg, as there have been by the Bolsheviki at Kazan and Ufa. At a dinner recently, General Semenoff-Merlin, First Assistant to General Rozanoff, smilingly said to me: "Semenoff (meaning Ataman Semenoff) has an original way of clearing his prisons, he executed 370 prisoners the other day in order to have more room." Such an attitude towards political suspects would be, I believe, fatal to any government. I will not review again the hundreds and thousands of cases of arrests and executions because of political beliefs – these facts have been included in past reports.

18. In conclusion, I desire to state that it is my belief that the Omsk government has been engaged in fighting democracy. A government in Russia which will successfully combat Bolshevism, must attract a large percentage of the people away from the Soviet cause. There seems no prospect that the Kolchak government, as now constructed, will ever do more than drive recruits into the ranks of the Bolsheviki.

R.L. EICHELBERGER,
Lt. Col., G.S., U.S.A.

And the last question. Does it follow from the above that not all the pages of the history of American-Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East have been read to the end?

It certainly does. We are still to learn a great deal.

Interviewer Boris Balkarei

Attempt to whitewash Stalin fails

A day in the courtroom

Ivan Shekhovtsov, a retired prosecutor from Kharkov, has repeatedly appealed to law courts, accusing newspaper and magazine editors and their contributors of having defamed the character of Joseph Stalin. Sixteen of his appeals were rejected, inasmuch as Shekhovtsov is not a relative of the deceased. However, the Sverdlovsk District People's Court of Moscow undertook to hear his last, 17th, appeal.

In his article, On the Eve, in the newspaper Sovyetskaya Kultura, the writer Ales Adamovich, according to Shekhovtsov, was guilty of libel. There now follows the excerpt from the said article which served as the basis for the lawsuit:

This lawyer, a convinced Stalinist, (meaning Shekhovtsov) writes: "So what if Vavilov was tortured. The point is that, according to the law, torture and other illegal methods may be accepted as grounds for annulling a verdict only if the persons who employed these methods were themselves convicted. But were any proceedings instituted in respect of the interrogator Khvat, who supposedly tortured Vavilov? Do you hear that jubilant friend of butchers gleefully invoking liberalism? In the 1960s, the hangmen escaped trial, taking cover behind the statute of limitations – which for some reason is allowed in this case. So a fig to you, and good riddance! Not your verdicts but ours are still valid! That's what he intimates. To read that makes one groan as if from toothache. But what else can one say when one is confronted by a stone wall, not a human being."



The plaintiff Shekhovtsov: "We seek to reanimate Stalin"

And so Shekhovtsov took himself off to Moscow.

Who are the hangmen?

The courtroom is jam-packed. There are many reporters, and cameramen are setting ready to shoot. Also present are writer Daniil Granin and journalist Andrei Nuikin.

Summoned as witnesses are the historians Yuri Karyakin, Avgust Mishin, Vasily Polikarpov and Sergei Sheboldayev. The public are aware of their contributions to the process, relating in particular to aspects of Soviet history and the problems of perestroika.

The defendants are Ales Adamovich and the editors of Sovetskaya Kultura.

The plaintiff is pensioner Ivan Shekhovtsov.

The presiding judge is Irina Troitskaya.

Ivan SHEKHOVTSOV:

He advances the above-quoted claims and substantiates his case.

Many articles are being published by incompetent writers, journalists and time-serving historians, especially Vasily Polikarpov et al. In his capacity as jurist and, he believes, as historian, Shekhovtsov has been through this material with a fine comb, to find proof and historical veracity. He concludes that the time-servers have besmirched our glorious history. They have defamed Stalin, a man ordained by fate to head the Party and the state for thirty years and who symbolized the nation. He is described as a criminal. From the angle of law and the presumption of innocence, one cannot say of anyone that he is a criminal if there has been no verdict to that effect. It is contended that people were tortured and that the lists of condemned persons carry approving comments by Stalin and Molotov; however, Shekhovtsov questions the existence of such documents. He wants to see these documents produced. Is there any verdict in respect of interrogator Khvat who allegedly tortured Academician Vavilov? Shekhovtsov is not aware of the existence of such a document. How can he, Shekhovtsov, be termed advocate of "hangmen" if the culpability of the persons whose honour he upholds has not been legally demonstrated? He demands of the defendants what he has set out in his suit, that they acknowledge the denigrating data as untenable, that their further circulation be forbidden, that Sovetskaya Kultura be obliged to issue a denial and that Ales Adamovich be compelled to publish an apology in connection with unverified material offered to the newspaper.

Ales ADAMOVICH:

You say there are no documents, no proof demonstrating that Vavilov was tortured and that no protests were lodged by the prosecutor's offices. You are a jurist and know very well that no prosecutor's office at all lodged any protests when the directive was issued from above to ignore the complaints proferred by defendants to the effect that they had been subjected to torture. Consequently, we will never obtain any documents on the doings of Khvat and the other interrogators.

You insist that the law be abided by. Yes, an inquiry must be instituted in respect of butchers and hangmen. When the time comes we will institute a full and proper inquiry. Then, to each his own, to Khvat what is Khvat's, to Stalin what is Stalin's.

Let me make the reservation that neither my family, my mother, father or brother, nor I myself suffered directly from Stalin's repression. I am not motivated by any personal grudge.

But I view myself nonetheless also as a victim and am prepared to present my own case against Stalin and his advocates.

It was Stalin who murdered most of my people.

It was Stalin who devastated my country's agriculture, by murdering its peasants, and now I, a possessor of a sixth of the earth, find myself unable to feed myself. He not only murdered the peasants, he also murdered such distinguished scientists as Nikolai Vavilov, using the butcher interrogators and butcher prosecutors from Khvat to Vyshinsky to do his dirty work.

It was Stalin who forced us for decades on end to view our fellow-citizens with suspicion wondering whether he or she was not an informer. In this way he isolated us, robbed us of the feeling of re-



spect for one another and thus of self-respect.

It was Stalin who through his policy of repression almost placed me in the brutal hands of the nazis, effectively surrendering 80 million of us. It was Stalin who subsequently called us traitors because we had lived in occupied territory!

Finally, it was Stalin who placed me in opposition to the entire human race, who so discredited socialism that millions felt it was better to be dead than red! By thus dividing the human race he imperilled the very survival of the human race to which I belong.

This is a far from complete list of the charges I profer against Stalin and his advocates.

Ivan SHEKHOVTSOV:

Is there any proof that Khvat was found guilty of employing unlawful methods of interrogation? Are there any legal grounds, apart from the mere allegations of newsmen and biologists?

Ales ADAMOVICH:

What we are dealing with here are the consequences, the consequences of the doings of all the Khvats taken together, of the whole of Vyshinsky-led jurisprudence, of all the interrogators and prosecutors. These consequences are the millions of our innocent people who were murdered. Do you want our society to genuflect again before the Khvats and before Stalin, just because they so expertly covered up the traces of their crimes? Because they were so proficient at processing and destroying the documents, so adept at processing everything according to the letter of the law while using torture to procure evidence. After all, they realized that at some time in the future their murders would out.

I very much regret that not one case in defence of Stalin has been heard. Yet it is vital to bring him to trial, in such a way as to place him in the dock before the entire people! So that no one at any time will ever dare represent him either to us or our descendants as the Great and Wise Leader, so that he will go down in history as the criminal he really was.

Vassily POLIKARPOV:

You call yourself a historian. Why then are you unaware of Stalin's telegram of January 20, 1939 enjoining Party bodies and the NKVD to employ physical measures against the defendants? You say nothing about that. On the other hand, you do take up cudgels for Khvat. If you are a historian, as you say you are, you must know that in 1937 alone, Stalin signed 383 lists of hundreds of names. You must know that these data have been verified in line with the procedures you insist upon as jurist.

Ivan SHEKHOVTSOV:

Do you know that after your Raskolnikov article, the BBC correspondent asked Muscovites what they thought of it?

The witness did not reply as the judges overruled the question as irrelevant.

Ivan SHEKHOVTSOV sums up:

An attempt has been made to besmirch my name as an opponent of perestroika, an ally of Nina Andreyeva. Perhaps today's trial will furnish the country with the Number Two opponent of perestroika after Andreyeva. If so, I will not be offended. Let history say who is right. We have no history in effect, it has been abolished. We seek to reanimate the history of the 1930s and the 1940s, libelled in recent years, along with its unique and heroic pages. We seek to restore the times when everything hostile to socialism, everything that lives and develops today behind the signboard of pluralism was ruthlessly extirpated. We seek to restore Stalin as the most faithful follower in Lenin's footsteps.

The judges retire to confer. On their return they announce that Shekhovtsov's appeal has been rejected.

The aggressive advocate phenomenon

Yuri KARYAKIN:

This advocate of Stalinism is, of course, himself a victim of Stalinism from both the moral and intellectual standpoint. From the moral standpoint because evidently his normal human feelings have atrophied. Millions of victims, and so many children among them! So many rehabilitated to end their days in illness and poverty! Help at least one of them. All the legal ins and outs will come to light later, but these people will no longer be here. So help them! That will be to your credit! But no, nothing of the sort. Such colossal energy! Seventeen appeals, plus so many letters and articles, all to keep hands off Stalin!

He is a victim too from the intellectual standpoint. Stalin can't be a criminal because he is the good genie. Why did we believe? Only because Stalin himself forced the entire machinery of the state to generate this faith.



Defendant Ales Adamovich: "We must institute an inquiry against the hangmen"

Though he might be a victim, he himself does not believe so. He even lays claim to professional expertise. Why then didn't he anwer my question as to what he, a jurist, thinks of Stalin's laws which repealed laws, introduced the extraordinary triumvirates, accelerated sentencing, had death sentences carried out at once, forbade all appeals and extended this "legislation" to apply to children from the age of twelve! Or the use of torture. That's my first point.

Secondly, how does he qualify for rehabilitation? Is it lawful or not? Hundreds of thousands have been rehabilitated. How then is one to qualify the Stalin-Beria verdicts? But he makes no bones about his dream. He unashamedly, openly dreams: "Summon me to a new trial of Pasternak. I will come and speak out!" What, is a trial of Pasternak lawful? No, it's absolutely unconstitutional! Incidentally, he is against trying the dead Stalin. But, he contends, the dead Pasternak can be tried? And hence all the rehabilitated should be re-tried? He will be only too delighted to appear.

And thirdly. Why doesn't he appeal to the law courts against the 20th, 22nd and 27th CPSU congresses which denounced Stalinism for its crimes? Why not appeal against the November 2, 1987 report and, into the bargain, against all who approved it? For that report directly states that there can be no forgiveness for the crimes of Stalin and his retinue. Why not appeal against the Byelorussian people who have just discovered a new Stalinist Oswiecim, that of Kurapaty... Let him go and speak there. Let him tell the witnesses and the few miraculously surviving victims and their relatives what a good fellow Stalin was.

Though seemingly unpretentious, this is a really historic trial. It's the **first** of its kind, a further proof that we are witnessing the historic finale, the last agonizing gasp of Stalinist demonism. We must muster all the facts, in total, so that no voice is ever raised again in defence of the hangman. Time and again the crimes of Stalin will shock us and make us shudder. Time and again tears and

righteous anger will blind us before we at last ask ourselves how we could have lived through this nightmare, how we could have believed in the mirage. That will likewise show that we are no longer the people we once were; that we are different. First we will come to realize what happened to us, how it happened, how we degenerated into slaves. Yet, that is still not enough. We must also comprehend the most important thing, our failure to understand – yes, I mean precisely that – our organic failure to grasp what must be the flesh of our flesh, the bone of our bone. How one can make oneself a slave.

Vassily POLIKARPOV:

Remember what he said: "The time has come for the criminal code to act?"

It is a long time since we last heard that. I think the last time was Lidia Timashuk's denunciation. Public consciousness has advanced so far, especially recently, that this flare-up of a heated brain, the result of some mental shock or personal gripe, rather than anything else, appears anachronistic.

However, we see in the courtroom facing the public its author, the author not only of this, but of seventeen appeals, a respectable-looking, 62-year-old citizen, a one-time jurist, interrogator, prosecutor and barrister who also claims to be a historian and a propagandist.

He found his experience as a barrister useful in defending Stalin and Khvat. He argues that neither can be regarded as a criminal or hangman, as only a court of law is entitled to find them guilty, but that by virtue of the statute of limitations nobody today can bring them to trial. We have missed the boat, so to say. The writer Ales Adamovich most aptly described this point in the ex-barrister's logic in Sovetskaya Kultura on May 19 when he qualified its exponent as "the jubilant advocate of butchery."

The plaintiff has applied his experience as prosecutor in the opposite direction. While investing the hangmen with "special" legal privileges, he takes it upon himself to describe as criminals the contributors to the published articles ("they undermine the Soviet state and social system"). This is sanctioned by the old practice of summary extrajudicial reprisal, by sundry "triumvirates," "duumvirates," and "special conferences," plus Vyshinsky's theoretical revelations implanted in the mind of this plaintiff-prosecutor while still at school and evidently carried forward in all their virginal form through years of practice.

The plaintiff does not take issue with Adamovich alone. In court he supplemented the list with the "irresponsible" newsmen and "affiliated" historians, "denigrating" Khvat, Stalin and their ilk. The latter, he claims, acted in conformity with the law, while the law of those times "expressed the sovereign will of the people." He refuses to hear that Stalin could on his own initiative prescribe the most draconian laws and annul laws he didn't like. He insists that these self-same laws be applied today to call the "denigrators" to account. This experienced jurist at once goes on to present a model of how this should be done. He declares the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court's July 10, 1963 reinstatement of Raskolnikov nonexistent and the earlier Stalin verdict as valid for all time.

They yearn for a return to the old order, to those ethical norms and those methods of denunciation and summary reprisal which would today "rectify" public awareness and reduce it to the common denominator that suits them.

But perestroika marches on, and the adepts of Stalinism are unlikely ever to check the growth of social awareness. We have no reason though to shut our eyes to those who are obsessed with nostalgic hankerings for former times. They have not been completely silenced. They not only keep the Stalin-Vyshinsky-Beria codes under their pillows. They are raising their heads to confront the public.

Andrei NUIKIN

Trials of this nature, such as a suit against a contributor to a publication or newspaper in Moscow, Leningrad and other major cities, are in a class of their own. This time the court-room teemed with experienced newsmen, and that was in no small measure a guarantee against error. That the trial was in full public view is most important.

However, I fear such trials could degenerate into a mockery of glasnost, a scourge against newsmen and a gag on the critically-minded; and all because we have no juridical basis whatever for such concepts as "libel" and "defamation."

The fact that it was Stalin who was in the dock today naturally ensured against a miscarriage of justice. But suppose one criticizes a person in high office and calls him a bureaucrat? After all, no law court can qualify anyone as a bureaucrat! Then suppose somebody writes that so-and-so has done something vile? What law court would return a verdict stating that this so-and-so is scoundrel? What will the law courts come to, if we have to go through protracted trials to uphold each and every criticism in the press?

We know what unfriendly and nervous reactions executives in the regional echelons show to even mild criticism in the local press with what willing, malicious glee they would quash that criticism by employing the "democratic" procedure of a law court! The more so, as what we call "telephone law," that is the telling of a judge what to do over the telephone, still seems to operate in some places.

* * *

I told judge Irina Troitskaya what Andrei Nuikin thought. She said what he said was important and that his doubts were reasonable.

"The number of such suits is snowballing. In the past few years we have had only a couple or so, but nowadays our particular court has already heard more than a hundred."

"With what result?"

"We have found in favour of the plaintiffs in some ten or so suits lodged against news media and contributors. Hence I would advise journalists to be very careful in what they write, and all seeking justice through the law courts to take critical stock of everything they do."

Anatoly Shlienkov

A reproduction of a picture by P. Belov
Photos by A. Fedorov

Every Olympiad displays one or two symbols as well as the Olympic rings to focus attention on an idea chosen by the host nation. The emblem of the 24th Olympic Games in Seoul is the Samthaeguk, a traditional Korean motif whose three colours signify heaven, earth and man. That symbol makes man the link between the spiritual and physical worlds. The emblem symbolizes the Olympic ideals of harmony and progress in attaining peace on Earth.

Symbols and years

There is a special meaning to various procedures at the opening ceremony. For instance, the Olympic torch was never carried into the Olympic stadium straight from the street, nor did anyone appear in the Olympic arena on any other "solo" mission.

Let us recall the Tokyo Olympics in 1964. Before those Games the Olympic torch had been carried into the central arena by outstanding athletes. At the Tokyo Olympics the torch was carried by 19-year-old student Yoshinori Sakai, who was born on August 6, 1945, the day when the U.S. atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima from the bomber named Enola Gay. The Olympic mission of Yashinori Sakai, born on that day, was a mission of protest against the nuclear threat. The young man ran on, and with every leap he took hope grew among the hushed audience for a better life on Earth, peace and a younger generation capable of preventing a nuclear holocaust. Many years have passed since then, but although other events of that Olympiad have dimmed in our memory, Yoshinori Sakai's run remains fresh in it.

The torch-bearer in Seoul was Son Kee Chung, the winner of the marathon events at the 1936 Olympics when he appeared on the Japanese side, as Korea was then under Japanese occupation. He is now 76. He has waited many years to be able to appear before the world in the uniform of his national team. With him on the green turf of the Olympic arena we saw a small boy, Yoon Tae Oong, trundling a hoop after the manner of all boys on all continents. The boy was born on September 30, 1981, the day the International Olympic Committee ruled that the 24th Summer Olympics be held in Seoul.

It is widely expected in South Korea that the Olympics will facilitate the country's emergence from isolation. Industrial and business circles are pinning high hopes on the Games. A world business centre was inaugurated here during the Games. The idea is to offer services to foreign businessmen. The centre is heav-

Sport at its best

From our special correspondents
Vitaly Ignatenko and Vladimir Ovsyannikov

ily computerized and there are simultaneous interpreting services available in its conference halls. The centre's information desk says it can provide only commercial information about South Korea and other nations.

Counting medals

At the moment the centre is evaluating the effect of the Olympics on business in South Korea, using Japan of 1964 as a precedent.

Local financiers compared Japan's economic performance before and after the Olympics. We were told at the Bank of Korea that the same effect is expected here.

The public relations man treated us to a cup of tea while we waited for facts and figures about Japan then and South Korea now. According to the information we were given, in terms of per capita income, Japan, 1964 was behind South Korea, 1988 to the tune of 466 dollars. Unlike Japan in those days, South Korea's balance of payments is in the black and its exports are higher.

The Olympics gave Japan a shot in the arm and a year after the Games the country's balance of payments was out of the red.

The officials we spoke to in Seoul believe that South Korea is about to get off to an even better start.

It is a widely held view that sports benefit the economy through advertising, and that is of course the case. Famous companies use the names of famous athletes to promote their products, as well as installing their advertisiments in sports arenas. We saw no bill boards advertizing Marlboro, Adidas, or Seven Up at Seoul's sports arenas. They look nice and neat, not unlike our own DINAMO stadium in Moscow. Don't they count on revenues from advertisements here?

Local economists believe the most important results will have to be waited for. The Korea Times says that athletes are not the only people to whom the Olympics are throwing the doors wide open. People in dozens of countries are watching South Korea closely to find out what the South Koreans can do, how well-organized they are, and whether they are likely to be good partners. We must show them, the paper goes on to say, that we are good partners and we must reaffirm our reputation in the eyes of those who already know us well.

The hosts of the 24th Olympics have learnt to make the most advanced computers, and that is evidence of hi-tech ability and business flair. Introducing computers can be a problem, though. The introduction of a new technology calls for quick thinking in an unfamiliar situation, and here problems arise from what appear to be definite traits in the national character, without which South Koreans would certainly find their lives easier. One has the impression that people are accustomed to thinking long and hard before taking a decision. In order to settle a trifling matter, for instance, one has to speak in turn to up to ten people only to return to Square One in the end. Perhaps that is due to the prolonged period of South Korea's isolation from the rest of the world. The doors are only now beginning to open. Never before have South Koreans had occasion to deal with hundreds of thousands of representaives of dozens of nations. As far as South Korea is concerned, a good showing at the Games will be a boost not only to the morale but also to the economy. Hence the delight here at the victory of the South Korean wrestler Kim Young Nam. Local financiers are also counting the gold medals won by others, and are not upset by anyone's defeats. With each Olympic day, more national anthems were played at Seoul and Seoul businessmen looked more optimistically into the future.

Alphabetical order does not do

National teams appeared on the Olympic arena in the order of the Korean Hangul alphabet. Iran was the sole exception. Its athletes did not follow in the steps of their Iraqi counterparts. The two teams were separated by three national teams in the parade. The Madagascar team failed to turn up at Seoul and gave a very short notice. Tennis players Boris Becker (F.R.G.) and Mats Wilander (Sweden) and the Soviet gymnast Yuri Korolev did not come either because of injuries.

Ben Johnson of Canada, a world record-holder in the 100-metre race, has been struck off the list of Olympic champions. The medical commission con-

Olga Strazheva, a gymnast from Zaporozhye, being taken away by her coach because of a trauma.

cluded that he had taken in an anabolic steroid called stanozolol. The International Track and Field Federation now has to express its attitude to what has happened. The IOC executive committee, to which the conclusion had been passed, unanimously annulled Johnson's world record and decided to take the Olympic gold medal away from him and ban his further presence at the Games.

Needless to say that all those involved in the Olympic Games have been deeply grieved by this extraordinary event. Stories, one more fantastic than another, are afloat here. They are coming mainly from Ben Johnson himself. But the executive commitee's decision has been put into effect. Johnson has been deprived of his award.

There were other unexpected developments as well. Few people seem to know that there were non-Koreans among the fearless athletes who descended on the Olympic arena on flying wing parachutes. Nikolai Ushmanov of the Soviet Union, for instance, took charge of a whole flight. The Algerian team was coached by Veniamin Rusanov of the U.S.S.R., and the Cameroun team was advised by his fellow countryman Eduard Matrosov in what is a clear sign of true Olympic solidarity.

The teams did not follow the order of the Hangul alphabet, naturally, once the Games got underway. The Soviet side took the lead from the outset and the name of our country moved from the middle of the Hangul and the end of the Latin alphabet into first place. We were glad to see the G.D.R., Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia close by.

carried the message of peace and brotherhood among men into the 20th century.

The history of the Olympic Games since then has been studded with records of human achievement. At the first Olympics in Athens in 1896 the first Olympic champion James Connolly of the United States set a record of 13 metres 71 centimetres for the triple jump. Soon after the turn of the century that was still an amazing feat, but senior high-school kids would look down their noses on it today. The record set by one man became an asset for all of humanity. At Seoul Christo Markov of Bulgaria set a record of 17 metres 61 centimetres.

"Citius, Altius, Fortius." The Olympic slogan now reads as a programme that mankind has followed since the turn of the century as the fastest men on Earth ran faster, the strongest grew stronger and high jump records kept on adding centimetres. At the turn of the century the record setter took an amazing 12 seconds to cover 100 metres, the high jump record stood at a decent 165 centimetres (they did not believe in the run-up then), and the weight-lifting record was a respectable 111.5 kilogrammes.

Irony aside, those were genuine records and they gave hope for more records in speed, strength and endurance. That hope has materialized as records and human ability have acquired new dimensions.

At the 24th Olympics the hundred-metre event was won by Carl Lewis of the U.S.A., who clocked less than 10 seconds, Ghennady Avdeyenko of the U.S.S.R. cleared 238 centimetres in the high jump and Uwe Dassler of the G.D.R. clocked 3 minutes 46.95 seconds in 400-metre swimming.

Thirty-odd years before the end of this century Bob Beamon recorded an incredible 8 metres 90 centimetres in the lomg jump and made history. His record, it is said, cannot be broken in the 20th century. And who would have thought that an athlete from a nation that has just been introduced to international sporting events would do better than the best? Swimmer Anthony Nesty from Surinam did just that in Seoul, winning the gold medal in the butterfly event. His victory in the 100-metre race put him one hundredth part of a second ahead of the famous Matt Biondi of the United States.

Anthony Nesty told newsmen that he had had a hunch he was going to win and now that he had won his happiness was unbounded.

Anthony Nesty is 20. He was born in Trinidad, from where his family moved to what was then Dutch Guiana when he was 9 months old. The head of the Surinam team Roselie Deyra said the were all delighted with the gold meda Few people, she added, seem to hav known anything about the country ti now.

Sport schools us all in endurance an commitment to being ahead of other and ahead of ourselves.

Onwards to records

In his lecture at the Sorbonne on November 25, 1892 Pierre de Coubertin proposed that athletes be sent to compete abroad to introduce the idea of peace to Europe. He expressed the hope that if his idea were supported he would be able to propose that the Olympic Games, transformed in keeping with the requirements of the day, be reintroduced.

Pierre de Coubertin got a round of hearty applause at the time but, as he later said, no one really understood what he had in mind.

It took a further four years for his idea to get off the ground. Sport



Ben Johnson, left, won the 100-metre race, but he was disqualified for having taken in a dope. Join with him on the finish line are Calvin Smith of the United States, Linford Christie of Great Britain, C Lewis of the United States, who came second and became a champion.

The bamboo pole was introduced for the first time at the London Olympics in 1908. The inventor Alfred Gilbert of the United States set a record of 3 metres 70 centimetres then and broke every standing record pole vault by a large margin. That record kept on edging upwards until several athletes in several countries topped the five metre mark after the fibreglass pole was introduced. Finally, Sergei Bubka of the Soviet Union topped the six-metre mark, setting a new challenge.



Three athletes – J. Borkai of Hungary, L. Geraskov of Bulgaria and Dmitry Bilozerchev of the Sovet Union – have been awarded gold medals for vaulting horse exercises.

Never give up

Today's sports rely on sophisticated technology. British and Portuguese yachtsmen used satellite communications and computer data processing in the race in Suong Bay. The computers and satellites provided them with comprehensive data about wind speeds, currents, ebbs and tides. Rumour has it that other teams have been using something even more sophisticated, but naturally they keep it all a secret.

Sport makes us all more human and more democratic. The inauguration of the Davis Cup in tennis in 1900 came as something of a revolution. Tennis was transformed from being a pastime of the nobility (Napoleon is said to have been fond of the game) into a professional sport, but since 1900 tennis professionals have never stooped to take part in the Olympics. They did turn up in Seoul, though, and the signs are they felt at ease amidst the other Olympians. They are getting used to standing in line at self-service eateries and to being bussed around. They practice just like everybody else in open courts and just like every tennis player worth his salt complain about their gear. The pros played with dignity when they were defeated (Chris Evert of the U.S.A.) and were delighted by preliminary victories (Steffi Graf). Their way to the first Olympic gold medals was not an easy one. Sport teaches us to never give up. There have been many Olympic athletes who stretched their ability to the very limit but even so won no prizes, yet they have never given up.

One athlete did not give up and won. He is the remarkable Soviet swimmer Vladimir Salnikov. For ten years he has defended his rank as the best long-distance swimmer this country has. That is a very long-standing record. He won three Olympic medals and several national, international and European titles. At first he basked in his fame, but gradually the fans grew accustomed to his wins and began to anticipate his withdrawal from big-time sport. Some people said that he had failed to retire gracefully in time, but whatever they said, Vladimir carried on, even if he did worse than his younger teammates. He worked very hard and was selected for the Olympic team at the eleventh hour after a particularly good showing at a preliminary contest. Some coaches said that the "Salnikov factor" discourages younger swimmers. It is too bad that at times all hopes in sport are pinned on those who are 18, 20, or 22.

Vladimir Salnikov demonstrated that you can do well even if you are pushing thirty. He would never have managed to get onto the Olympic team had it not been for the democratic and honest approach to selection in a spirit of true sportsmanship adopted by the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports.

Vladimir Salnikov won his fourth Olympic gold medal in the 1,500 metres, a unique achievement and a reminder to us all that it does not pay to give up.

The U.S.S.R., China and the U.S.A. met in an Olympic sports arena for the first time in 32 years. We know the reasons for this now. Sport obeys its own laws, and there can be no doubt at all that the current lists of records would have looked very different had it not been for the loss of Olympic continuity in our three countries. Sports remind us of political problems of old and reproach us all in this way, but they continue to give millions lessons in perseverence and optimism.

The Olympics in Seoul has not made the way to new records any shorter. It has merely marked another step on mankind's path to perfection.

SEOUL

TASS telephoto – AP laserphoto

The political weekly New Times provides a full and clear picture of highlights in the Soviet Union and the world

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

Professional pianist, professional writer and professional politician are all facets of a single personality – 42-year-old **Ibrahim Souss.** He is the chief representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Paris. Which of these is his main occupation then? Unquestionably, politics. He has devoted his talent as a writer to it.

A native of Jerusalem, he left his homeland with his parents in 1948 when many Arabs had to move to neighbouring countries. His father, a Christian and church organist, returned home with his family and again settled in East Jerusalem. In an English barracks 12-year-old Ibrahim discovered an old piano which he began to learn to play. He studied music in Jerusalem and perfected his skill in Munich, London, and Paris, and then began to give concerts.

Politics cut into his life in 1967, when the Arab-Israeli war broke out. Since then he has held important posts in the PLO.

One way or another his books are dedicated to the Palestinian problem. His first book was a collection of poetry. Then last year he published his novel "Far from Jerusalem," the story of a tragic love between a Jewish girl and a young Arab man. His third and latest book "Letter to a Jewish Friend" has recently appeared and is a great success. It has been published in Spain and Italy. The book's title is reminiscent of the novel "Letter to a German Friend" by Albert Camus.

"My friend," writes Ibrahim Souss, "I am not fooled. You talked me about security, but the issue was realization of a biblical dream. You wanted Israel to set up a lebensraum, vital to its economic flowering."

* * *

To all apeparances, the career of **Michio Watanabe,** Chairman of the Policy Board of Japan's ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, will not be affected by the scandal associated with his recent speech at the party seminar in Karuizawa. Speaking to his party associates, Watanabe referred contemptuously to black Americans and other ethnic groups in the United States. He depicted them as people of questionable moral standards.

Watanabe's words sparked off the anger of the U.S. Black Congressmen's Council and



the Black Publishers Association, which puts out newspapers for the black community in the U.S. Japan's Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, expressing his regret about the resentment of "our friends in the U.S.," had to present his apologies, but his message failed to satisfy those it was intended for. The Prime Minister did not respond to the congressmen's suggestion that an educational programme be set up to fight racial prejudice in Japan. However, a programme of the kind would be of some use. Two years ago the then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, also in the company of party associates, made a scathing reference to the intellectual abilities of black Americans, saying that because of the substandard level of development of ethnic minorities, the United States was losing out in technological competition with Japan. At the time Nakasone also apologized, but the leaders of the Liberal-Democratic Party stuck to their view. The discrimination against Chinese and Koreans residing in Japan and statements like these made by the country's leaders are the evidence of strong nationalist sentiments there.

Michio Watanabe, a member of Parliament, has held government and party posts. This story has effectively been avoided by the Japanese press.

* * *

Trade representative

Christoph Starke, General Director of the G.D.R. exhibition currently being held in Moscow, claims that the present exhibition of the republic's economic achievements is the largest ever shown abroad.

Though it is the first time that Christoph Starke has headed such an undertaking, he has had considerable experience in foreign trade. For the past six years he has been the G.D.R. trade representative in the Soviet Union.

"The main objective of the exhibition is to acquaint Soviet managers with our potential for scientific, technological and economic cooperation," Christoph Starke says. "The changes under way in the U.S.S.R. open up great opportunities for the establishment of direct ties between enterprises. When can an exhibition

be regarded a success? Only if the consumer is convinced that it is profitable for him to develop ties with enterprises in the G.D.R., as he can be sure of high quality products and will save on labour and material costs. And the establishment of business relations is promoted by the so-called thematic days – microele tronics, biotechnology, agric ture and food industry – whe Soviet specialists of all rani including ministers, get to kn the products along with re resentatives of industry and a riculture from the G.D.R."

Christoph Starke is graduate of the Philologi Faculty of Humboldt Univ sity in Berlin. He majored Chinese. But at the Ministry Foreign Trade, where began to work after leav University, they had ot ideas. He was sent to the partment that dealt with tablishing economic relatic with the Soviet Union. He h worked in this field for as lo as 24 years, for half this per residing with his family in U.S.S.R. Now he barely members any Chinese bu pretty fluent in Russian...

The Moscow music youth centre, led by well-known rock musician **Stas Namin,** is receiving guests. They are the American Tom Newman rock ballet, presenting the programme "The Master's Dream."

"Rock ballet is an unusual genre for rock music," says Stas Namin. "The ballet's tours in the U.S. and Western Europe have been a great success, and not just with young people. That is why we invited Tom Newman to Moscow..."

The rock group Flowers, popular in the U.S.S.R., was organized by Stas Namin in 1972. Over the last fifteen years, he and his group have toured the Soviet Union as well as the German Democratic Republic, Poland, France, Japan and the United States.

In recent years he has worked mainly as a producer. The music youth centre, which he has sponsored, has given many groups the opportunity to present themselves to audiences both in the U.S.S.R. and abroad. The centre now has about fifteen rock groups affiliated to it and though some of them are hardly known beyond Moscow, in the opinion of Stas Namin all of them are pretty promising.

One such rock group, Gorky Park, was introduced by him during a recent tour of the United States. According to the contract signed with Kramer Records, the musicians recorded a representative album to be released in the U.S. (One number was included on the disk "Rock against drug addiction," which the Soviet rock group shares with such rock stars as "Def Leppard," "Bon Jovi" and "Van Halen.")

* * *



Sports fans in the G.D.R. as well as all who are fond of swimming have had few doubts that **Kristin Otto** will return a winner from Seoul. And the first Olympic contest was to justify these hopes as the swimmer came first in the 100-metre free-style event, leaving her rivals with practically no chances. This proved "a golden start" for the G.D.R. national women's swimming team at the Olympiad. Kristin Otto has now won five more gold medals.

Kristin's hallmark is consistency. At the world swimming championship in Guayaquil (Ecuador) in 1982, the sixteen-year-old swimmer won three gold medals. Last year at the European championship in Strasbourg she won five golds, the finest achievement in her sporting career.

The way to swimming victory was not an easy one for Kristin. At the beginning of her sporting career she did not think of swimming, and went in for track-and-field athletics at school in her native Leipzig. But then she once appeared in the swimming pool and attracted the attention of experienced coaches.

Her studies will be the most important thing for her after the Seoul Games. In order to become a good sports journalist, Kristin's dream, she will have to work as hard as in the swimming pool.

* * *

t takes two to tango

A joint Soviet-Swedish ven-re has been set up in a pic-esque part of Moscow, the un water meadow. The ntry's first golf club has ned here. Its founder is **n Johansson,** the well-own Swedish hockey yer, known to fans as umba" Johansson.

"In this complex world," n Johansson says, "there e moments when represen-tives of different economic stems, religions and races come friends, showing ch other feelings of toler-ce, affection and respect. d all this happens thanks to ort. Playing golf, one grows ser to nature, and at the me time the sport engthens friendship..."

At the opening ceremony e ribbon was cut by Valery ikin, Chairman of the Mos-w Executive Committee, d **Pele,** the outstanding tball player.

"It is twenty-three years nce I first visited your coun-," said the famous Brazilian tballer. "This time the occa-n for my visit is somewhat usual. I shall try to master e ABC of golf, which up to w has been entirely un-own to me. I believe the ort will become popular in e Soviet Union.

onsiderable changes have me about in Soviet foot-

Photo by Sergei Bermenyev

ball," Pele went on to say. "This is evidenced by the performance of your team at the championship in Mexico. Extraordinary football players have appreared in your country. It is significant that the world's major football clubs are closely watching the performance of your footballers. I won't be surprised if in a short while six Soveit football players are included in the world team. The invitation extended to Alexander Zavarov by Juventus is, in my opinion, only a beginning. To my mind, Platini, Maradona and Zavarov are of equal standing. It is footballers like these who are missing from the national teams of Italy, Spain, Brazil and Argentina."

The next day Pele was as good as his word, and arrived to take a golf lesson from "Tumba." For upwards of an hour and a half Johansson instructed, and trained the football "king" in the techniques of the game. The boys fetched and silently placed baskets of golfballs on the grass. Suddenly there was a break in the game. Sven, explaining a trick, took his friend by the hand and accidentally put his other hand on the other's shoulder. And the two champions unexpectedly began to dance a tango. The boys standing nearby started to clap hands enthusiastically...

Jaroslav Novitsky

In quest of a youth idol

Who is to be emulated now as the hero of one's life? The names of lone heroes and unbending warriors immediately come to mind. Rambo recently joined that club...

Three school teachers gathered together on a bleak autumn day to discuss a chapter in a new textbook. That particular chapter was a problem for them, although they were used to working fast as a team. The title of the chapter was "Models from life – Life as a model." The idea was to find a hero whose life would inspire the younger generation and help them find the right moral guidelines.

Why did they find it so hard to reach agreement? There are plenty of heroes in history books, or so it seems...

It transpired after a while that these heroes working their way from one textbook into anotehr are not really worthy of emulation. A captain who follows the lamentable tradition and goes to the bottom together with his ship without even having tried to save his own life. The commander of a fortress who holds out with his garrison to the last cartridge to enable civilians to flee, without it once occurring to him that no one has a right to take one life to save another. A soldier who sets off a mine strapped to his back to make a hole in enemy fortifications. "We have no right to represent them as heroes," says one of the teachers, "they are no better than poison to the mind. A true hero teaches you something and these 'heroes' cannot teach you anything at all."

Now, what heroes are worthy of emulation, in their view? A young physician declining an offer from his father to take the cushy job he now occupies on his retirement, because keeping that job will require a great deal of cunning. And the young man refuses. A soldier who bumps into a man who has escaped from an extermination camp, is afraid, but he tells no one and even steals food to feed the man.

Is there anything at all suprising about the actions of these people? Is there anything heroic about their deeds beyond ordinary integrity? They did not display superhuman strength or courage, but merely acted as humans in ordinary situation.

Here is another story that delighted the teachers. A middle-aged woman learns that a friend she made when she was young and several of his colleagues have been jailed by the "Black Colonels" in Greece. She devises her own way of supporting them. She rents a room the size of a prison cell, finds out how much food prisoners are allowed and how many letters they can get and perseveres in the name of her friends and fellow human beings.

That story was told by the West German author Siegfried Lenz in "Das Vorbild," a novel translated into Russian but almost unnoticed here, largely because of the improbable hero he chose. There are different notions of a hero prevailing in the public mind.

Heroes in the movies and in real life

The film-director Stanislav Govorukhin has asked in a large circulation paper whether we need a Rambo of our own. Here is what he writes: "Sylvester Stallone's hero is an honest and courageous man, a soldier. His only crime is that he never lets anyone humiliate him and defends his dignity always, alone against overwhelming odds. The problem facing us should be defined in this way. Do we want our boys to grow up to be real men capable of fighting for their dignity and protecting the weak and elderly, and ultimately defending their country? If we do, we need a hero like Rambo, like Tarzan, a hero noble and courageous whom our boys would like to emulate."

There would seem to be little sense in arguing with the film director. His genre after all is action movies, and obviously he could not resist the appeal of a profesionally made action movie, but since action movies are frowned on here he is at pains to find a lofty argument in favour of his own line of reasoning.

Rambo has come for a great deal of battering in the press, and not just in the Soviet press. To a Soviet film critic, Rambo is a bad guy because Soviets are cast as villains in Rambo movies, but that happens to add to the Rambo appeal where these movies were made. It must be said that there, too, Rambo appalled serious critics, but not because they feared that an unbalanced youth, having seen Rambo in action, would try to reenact his feats in real life and break the law. Rambo spills no more synthetic blood than do our own cinematic heroes fighting bandits in Central Asia in the thirties, or getting after foreign intelligence agents. Anyway I have no right to decide for anyone what movies he or she should see.

Liberal Western reviewers had no use for Rambo, who could have passed as a hero for French as well as American boys with the greatest of ease, because they did not want their children to model themselves on the likes of him.

Rambo is an ideal warrior who stands alone. He is capable of beating any enemy to pulp and his appeal resides in his drive to punish the baddies, who, for the sake of clarity, are no better than monsters.

The meaning of his life is to spot the enemy and kill him. He is the product of a strain of political culture that is present in both East and West.

What can you do in a situation where good cannot be told from evil, especially if you are not accustomed to forming your own judgement? Could it be that good in the guise of evil could become a target? A powerful personality educated in violence summarily sentences an "enemy of the people" to death, becomes a death-camp warden, assumes responsibility for dealing with some "nationality" problem once and for all, or takes it to be his duty to fight in a criminal war and kill the local people to assert a cause based on faith in traditional values.

The French philosopher Andrè Glucksmann recalled this. "When I was a child I saw how they sent my parents off to Auschwitz. Later on I made a discovery that set my own dogmas on their head. I

discovered that built into myself and my relatives is a readiness to set up extermination camps or at least not to protest against their existence, eactly for the sake of good, for the sake of the triumph of a better world. Just like a blind Faustus dreaming of changing the world and ending up digging his own grave, or Ivan Denisovich working frenetically to build his own jail."

For the sake of the good?...

The history of the 20th century has given us plenty of examples of good intentions turning to evil, and the great ideals of a world for one and all and happiness for one and all spawning monsters.

Is it not silly to try and impose good on people, each of whom has his or her own idea of it?

Novalis wrote that the most dangerous rival of a moral ideal is the ideal of supreme power or vitality, also known as the ideal of esthetic grandeur, an essentially correct but somewhat contradictory term. That ideal was evolved by barbarism, and it is only to be regretted that in this day and age of cultural degeneration it has rallied a considerable following, especially among the weak and lowly. That ideal projects man as a semi-god-semi-beast, and the weak are unable to resist the forceful appeal of the blasphemous audacity of that fusion.

Western reviewers look on Rambo as an anachronism, a rudiment of the past years of madness, a monster-hero who has outlived his day. The deadly apparition that has again divided the world into good and bad on the silver screen is indeed a thing of the past. The time has come for other heroes and other moral models.

It seems to me that the utmost discretion is called for in dealing with the appeal of a strong personality who never doubts the sentences he metes out. There have been plenty such personalities in our own history. It is a feature of our cultural life now that we have finally and tormentedly come to settle accounts with our own past. The reappraisal of historic personalities cannot be taken separately from the reappraisal of moral values. He who was prepared to execute any order was assigned a higher value than he who talked back or had his own opinion. No effort was made to encourage the doubter who was unable to divide the world into black and white, or red and black. The most popular heroes in fiction and the arts in general were those who hit first and thought later. But what are we going to do now with the whole host of heroes that people our book shelves and come alive on the silver screen? What are we going to do with those who wipe out whole crowds of kulaks as they carry through "total collectivization"? We read in the papers now what collectivization was really all about, but in our mass culture and our mythologized minds the bearded kulaks and youthful tenderfoots of the OGPU (Supreme Political Administration) still shoot each other.

Is there anything special about Rambo, really? We have heroes of the same kind in our own mass culture. They are a little more articulate, their muscles do not bulge quite like Rambo's, and the location sets are not quite as magnificent, but, well, our producers and directors have to make do with tighter budgets than those enjoyed by the makers of Rambo and Rocky. Anyway, is there any sense in trying to compete?

American film-makers keep going back to the traumatic experience of Vietnam, and they have made excellent movies about men at war. Oliver Stone's "Platoon," Stanley Kubrik's "Full Metal Jacket," and Barry Levinton's "Good Morning, Vietnam" are in that category. Their heroes are quite unlike Rambo, they know that to kill is a sin and that every human life is precious. They do not have Rambo's unblinking commitment to "us" against "them," and they know that they must fight those who sent them to war and forced them to kill rather than those behind the enemy lines.

I doubt very much that, having seen Oliver Stone's or Stanley Kubrik's movies, a young man would decide to join the army. These films are no advertisement for the draft board, but then it is not the prime function of the arts to foster patriotic sentiments in recruits and conscripts. Its function is to awaken human sympathy, the ability to think, and the ability to love.

We can of course buy Rambo, and put it on the club and video circuit, but at best Rambo can teach nothing at all, and at worst he can drive the habit of a two-dimensional perception of the world deeper. We would do far better if our young people were to see realistic films about Afghanistan, but not in the spirit of Rambo. A truthful film about war, which maims body and soul alike, would give a warning to those who, like Rambo, are used to settling all problems by means of weapons.

Come to think of it, it is more rewarding and dignified to live without hero-worship, but rather to obey one's conscience and the laws of humanism.



Drawing by Vladimir Nenashev

Leonid Mlechin

JUNIOR WORLD



The last classic

The seventieth anniversary of Vasily Sukhomlinsky's birth was recently marked in this country. In his lifetime I had predicted that his name would feature in all educational textbooks. I proved right: in today's bibliographies, works by Sukhomlinsky are listed immediately after the classics of Marxism-Leninism, Nadezhda Krupskaya and Anton Makarenko. Some of the young people I have met were certain that Sukhomlinsky lived in the last century – a sure sign of profound reverence. In fact, he died fairly recently, in 1970. He had been severely wounded in the 1941 campaign, and mortally wounded in the campaign launched against him by official pedagogy at the end of the sixties. He came under heavy fire chiefly for advocating "vague humanist ideas" (to quote a critique of the time).

Some twenty years ago, a scientist of my acquaintance (a Doctor of Physics and Mathematics working in Academic Town, Novosibirsk) asked me: "Could you tell me what Sukhomlinsky has done? In just a few words, please."

The physical sciences insist on exactitude even in the humanities, and not surprisingly so: the real humanities are supposed to be more exact than physics – many discoveries made in physics eventually prove to be either of transient value, or shams; on the other hand, all discoveries made in the humanities (pedagogy included) are of enduring importance. Physics can always be set out in a single volume, while any discipline in the humanities could fill a thousand and one. Sukhomlinsky dwelt on things that have always been common knowledge; at the same time, what he said always struck everyone as a revelation from the start. Or, rather, a revolution.

Just in a few words? All right, he changed pedagogy, that's what he did. At the time when Vasily Sukhomlinsky's books were coming out one after another, Stalinist pedagogy still reigned supreme, the gist of it being: inform on others in order to survive. The Brezhnev pedagogy – "pilfer to survive" – was already emerging. Experience itself taught this to adults and, consequently, to children. An authoritarian-punitive theory that fitted into a primitive scheme: "order and punish" was being preached in schools. Tell a child to do this or that, and if he fails to comply with your demand ("reasonable," of course) punish him. Few have heard of such pedagogy, but what do we know about school in general? We are still unaware of the fact that the "order and punish" pedagogy is even now being taught to future schoolteachers at almost all teacher training institutes. As a result, we have a yawning generation gap and hosts of soulless youngsters.

Sukhomlinsky destroyed, as best he could, these cast-iron theories. This schoolteacher-cum-scientist, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, brought childhood back to pedagogy, the science concerned with childhood. That's what he did, in just a few words. If you see a little boy looking out of the window in the middle of a lesson, do not touch him, the teacher Sukhomlinsky said; he is riding high on the waves of childhood.

Sukhomlinsky's heart was attuned to childhood. He was the first of the now well-known writers to utter, at the top of his voice, the words "humanity," "charity," "kindness," "conscience," "spiritual values." He didn't merely pay lip service to these ideas. He told children that man is immortal... What he hated most of all was callousness. There is nothing more dangerous than hardheartedness, and the most dangerous people are those who do not feel for the sufferings of others and who are so thick-skinned it's no use trying to appeal to them for mercy – they won't hear you.

Sukhomlinsky's main principle was a very simple one: don't try too hard to fight a child's faults; they will disappear of their own accord if the adult can discern in the little person the makings of a good man that are to be found in every soul. Instead of the pedagogy of destruction and ruthless suppression, Sukhomlinsky promoted the pedagogy of warm relations, cultivating spiritual values in a child. "I Give My Heart to Children" is the title of his greatest work now translated into many languages. Before Sukhomlinsky, the word "heart" had hardly occurred in learned books on education at all...

This certainly could not fail to anger those in control of secondary education at the time. After Sukhomlinsky's death, many volumes of his works were published in Ukrainian and Russian; nevertheless, a school principal told me that following his successful speech at a teachers' conference quite recently, he was summoned to the presidium, commended for the address but reproached, in the same breath, with "quoting too much from this Sukhomlinsky." Sukhomlinsky is persona non grata for Very Important Persons in pedagogy. Simply speaking, he is not their sort... Although his books are now quoted in research papers and included in recommended bibliographies, he still remains a "foreign body"... I have never heard of, or seen a school which has adopted his teaching methods. His time is only beginning to come.

In conclusion I shall mention the two of Sukhomlinsky's ideas that I like best.

He said that education boils down to an ever more profound understanding of the child. In other words, one should regard understanding a child not as a means of education, but as education in itself. I am sure the reader will appreciate the depth, wisdom and aptness of this idea, which seems paradoxical – but only at first glance. As we begin to understand a child, we show humaneness, we look into his eyes, we forgive him, we arouse warm responses in him. We all know that happiness lies in being understood. Education through understanding is education through happiness. Sukhomlinsky gave a brilliant answer to the difficult question of what one should study for at all. A man must study because he is a man, was Sukhomlinsky's reply.

There is no doubt that the Sukhomlinsky centenary will be celebrated by UNESCO.

Simon Soloveichik



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